

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

(Limited to a part of the field)

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The publications since 1920 on the psychology of religion are so numerous and so varied that any brief survey of them must necessarily restrict, with more or less arbitrariness, the field of its attention. Although psychologists of religion may glean much from certain portrayals of concrete experiences furnished by biographies and historical studies, this literature must here be left uncited. We shall also omit studies of magic and of primitive culture generally, along with publications that might be claimed by anthropology, sociology or history, and a vast literature that is decidedly popular or scientifically inferior. With this mere mention we pass the rich material in the eleventh and twelfth volumes of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* and in the *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*. As to the broad field of religious mysticism and the literature essentially Freudian in method, they have been sundered out for treatment by others in special articles of this number of the BULLETIN. Despite all these restrictions and omissions, that which still remains for our presentation is so vast in amount and in range of method, problem, and conclusion as to permit of but the most hurried notice.

The period under our consideration has brought to a close the earnest work of Girgensohn¹ (19, 20, 21). He early became con-

¹ Girgensohn died at the age of fifty on September 20, 1925. First a professor in Greifswald, he later transferred to Leipzig.

vinced that it was not through investigations of historical persons or phenomena but alone through the study of living individuals that the psychology of religion could enjoy a healthy scientific growth. His touch with American publications, however, left him with a belief that real advance would depend upon the discovery of an experimental method that would bring to light material of whose existence the experimenter himself had previously been not at all, or but very dimly, aware. The psychoanalytic methods met this condition but they seemed unsatisfactory on other counts. Such being the case, Girgensohn was challenged by the work of Marbe, Watt, Messer, Buehler, and Ach—by their method of systematic introspection under controlled conditions, as well as by their discovery of elusive and unintuitable material and functions of consciousness. For his guide he turned to Kuelpe. The latter's influence in this field had already extended to the *Nuernberger Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Religionspsychologie*, in whose organ, *Archiv fuer Religionspsychologie*, W. Staehlin, in 1914, published the first article inspired by the new method.

Girgensohn selected a number of very different religious poems, both familiar and unfamiliar, and set his highly trained observers the task of expressing a judgment as to their worth after a single reading made in as natural a manner as possible. At the outset, the observers were asked to give both objective and subjective evaluations, but this distinction was later dropped. Indeed, it gradually also seemed advisable to ask merely in general for the experiences of the observers. In short, the details of the method were constantly revised in the course of the work. But into this we may not further enter. Reports were received also of experiences when the poems were read under such conditions as to permit the emergence of free associations. Through a carefully prepared direct questioning of the observers regarding the details of their reports, and through verbal attacks upon them, replies were elicited which afforded added insight into the bases of the observers' faith. To learn more fully the nature of religious trust, trained introspectionists were asked to call to mind individuals in whom they had trust and then to describe the various elements and relations discoverable in the experience. Again, the observers were asked to turn their thought upon concepts selected from the catechism, maintaining the same attitude as though in school. Kuelpe had recommended also the immediate recording of spontaneous experiences, as these might from time to time arise, the

thought being that this would supplement the material obtainable through introspection under experimental conditions.

In the form in which it had first been employed in the general field of psychology, this method suffered attacks from Wundt. Not unnaturally Girgensohn's particular use of it likewise became a target for criticism (see, *e.g.*, Spranger, 55, p. 299n). Behn (7), however, has reemphasized the value of introspection, insisting that self-observation is the most receptive of all thought processes, neither creating nor altering its contents (nor dealing with simply revived experiences) but reporting them as they are, without judgment upon them or apprehension of their laws; likewise he stresses the added value that accrues from experimental safeguards. Again, it was asked whether the fruits were such as to validate the method. What contributions accrued from Girgensohn's heavy labors as recorded in a volume of over seven hundred closely printed pages, many of them in small type? A partial answer may be provisionally suggested by introducing at this point some recent work by Starbuck and one of his students, E. Leigh Mudge.

Starbuck (57) sharply demarcates the so-called higher senses, such as sight and hearing, from the "intimate" senses, such as the organic senses and the warm and cold mechanisms. According to him, the former are peculiarly apt to define their objects, to give them specific spatial and temporal settings, and to relate them more or less schematically to other objects. Their part in the deeper and riper religious experiences, however, he finds to be quite subordinate. It is the "intimate" senses that here play the central rôle. Their findings, though in one sense private, are truly sharable; in their reference and their validity they are as consistently objective as are the "defining" senses. They afford a direct, immediate experience of their objects; and they are indispensably involved in the process of bodily and social adjustment. They are the "sources of wisdom," of meaning and value, in religious, as in ethical and aesthetic, experience. Religion has acquired a peculiar adeptness in arousing the "intimate" senses and for this reason it has been so well able to propagate itself. In his doctoral dissertation on the God-experience, Mudge (40) has found a field for the application and the confirmation of this general doctrine.

Now as regards the relative rôle of the particular kinds of sense experience in religion, Girgensohn's results had been very much the same. Though he had noted significant differences as between individuals, he nevertheless discovered that the kinaesthetic material was

more regularly present than any other—indeed, that it alone was in every case to be found—and that it was never marginal, as were, for example, visual and other data. On the other hand, it became apparent to him that experiences differ greatly, ranging from the concrete to the abstract, from those in which sense data bulk large to those essentially non-presentational. Moreover, he concluded that a rigid analysis of any concrete, complex religious experience would show that no sort of sense material, presentation, or image is really more than secondary. More basic is some activity or function—some distinctive content quite other than that of either the “defining” or the “intimate” senses. The latter disclose themselves as the vehicles of what is non-presentational. They are essentially symbolic in character. Hence, though in themselves apparently enigmatic or absurd, they may yet indicate a meaning worthy of search. Feelings of pleasure or displeasure, too, are subordinate. Bliss and joy are mere accompaniments. Much the same may be said of the volitional processes. In religion they are indeed aroused. Conversion, for example, reaches its consummation only with a dedication of the will. Yet conversion itself depends upon deep-lying processes which alone enable the will to exercise itself with freedom in the direction of religious realization. The volitional functions, thus, are not primary; they are symptoms, as it were, of an inner change; they are the active expressions of a new life. The real and ultimate secret of religion is to be found in a new attitude of the ego such as arises without a consciousness of freedom. The core of religion is an intuitively entertained God-consciousness and a characteristic relation or attitude of the self thereto. As regards the latter, there is an alternation between an intensified self-feeling, wherein the ego is expansive and beautiful through the indwelling of the divine, and a diminished or annulled self-feeling, in which the boundary between the Ego and the Other has faded or disappeared. In a long section devoted to a comparison of his results with what one finds in the accounts given by mystics, Girgensohn finds a remarkable harmony. That is, in his view ordinary religious experiences include, at least marginally or in some degree, the features long known to characterize mysticism. One finds in them tendencies towards a lapse of the consciousness of time and space; the experience of thoughts and feelings as not one's own but as those of another who, however, is yet not demarcated from one's self; the dedication of one's self to a being that is greater and is yet valued as one's very own.

For Wobbermin (67, 68) also every exclusively observational or

strictly objective empiricism stands condemned; the nature of religion discloses itself only from within the experience itself. To overcome sheer subjectivism, however, the individual must, through an act of imagination, put himself in the very midst of forms of religious life other than his own. Utilizing his personal inner life as a key, he must especially attempt to get at the core of the major historical religions. Thus will his own perception of religion's nature be refined and his power increased of discriminating the truly universal features of his own experience. The method of Wobbermin thus involves creative empathy and a *religionspsychologischer Zirkel*. Since this method empowers one to distinguish the accidental, transitory, and subjective from the central and permanent features of the experience, and thus leads to a definition of what religion truly is, Wobbermin has described it as transcendental. The view of religion to which it leads is that of "a relationship of man to an overworld in which he believes and in belief foreknows, on which he feels himself dependent, in whose shelter he knows himself to be secure and which is the goal of his heart's most ardent yearning" (67, p. 254).

Hoeffding's monograph (28), though bringing out the psychological and epistemological relations between experience and interpretation, nevertheless follows the path of his earlier *Philosophy of Religion* in definitely sundering them. A comparative study of mystical phenomena of different types and periods leads him to the conclusion that personal experience has acquired a constantly increasing importance and independence until we of to-day tend to hold that nothing that does not spring from it is of religious value. Now it is experience which Wobbermin also stresses. He, however, thinks of it as including ideas and interpretation. Psychologically, he contends, religious experience incorporates an element of conviction, as well as some formulation thereof in ideational or even rational terms; also imagery of various sorts, distinguishable as primary and secondary. The ideational and imaginal constituents are, to be sure, strongly dominated by social influences; yet the experience as a whole, he holds, is essentially individual rather than social in character.

Winkler (66) belongs to those who believe that every strictly psychological approach is hopelessly inadequate because in every form, as even in that of Wobbermin, it retains vestiges of subjectivism. Recourse is therefore taken to the phenomenological method, as this has been developed in general more especially by Husserl and his school. So also Stavenhagen (58). He argues that every

empirical account of religion, whether psychological, historical, or sociological, *presupposes* some conception by the use of which the particular set of facts studied is delimited from those which are left to one side as non-religious. Such being the case, this presupposed conception must be attained by *a priori* methods. Through reflective intuition one must and one may arrive at absolute and ontological truths, whether the materials that furnish the starting points and the cues are drawings or figures, as in the case of geometry, or personal experiences as in the case of religion. In both cases alike we may, through *Wesensschau*, penetrate from and through empirical data to universal, objective, ultimate features or essences. It is only thus (and not, for example, by an alternation between the inner experience of the individual and the soul of another or of an historical religion, as Wobbermin had argued) that we may escape from subjectivism to rationality. Religion is then seen to be a personal attitude that is absolute in its character. Its two main types culminate in (a) *Ehrfurchtsreligion*, in which the individual is conscious of his absolute nothingness in relation to a divine being absolutely unapproachable in the character of *tremenda majestas*, and (b) *Liebesreligion*, characterized by a consciousness of absolute at-homeness and security (*Geborgensein*) and by an object or noema representing the absolutely paternal. The fusion of these two types, in so far as attainable, yields the highest form of religion.

Spranger (55) is thoroughly alive to the force of the contention that the psychology of religion must look to non-psychological methods for that conception or definition of religion without which it cannot intelligently get under way. He realizes the great difficulty, if not the sheer impossibility, of completely sundering considerations of validity and of relative worth from psychological description. Nevertheless he holds that the latter may safely proceed in practical independence of the former provided it guards against narrowness of outlook and takes under observation primitive, undeveloped, and degenerate forms of "religion," and also phenomena but partially "religious." While in so far subscribing to a strictly empirical method, he is conscious of the limitations of the questionnaire, of diaries, or of the experimentally controlled introspections secured by Girsensohn. Superior, in his view, is the procedure of Bohne who enriched our knowledge of adolescent religious development through the use of autobiographical materials (9). Spranger refers with appreciation to an essay in a memorial volume dedicated to Max Weber in which Hans Gruhle discusses autobiography as a source of

historical knowledge. In autobiographies personal contacts loom large, and it is through these, more especially, that religion is kindled and nourished.

Thus holding, Spranger is critical also of the method employed by Dehn in determining the religious outlook of the proletarian youth (17). To the latter Dehn presented as themes for essays three words so selected that, though in a way unconnected, they could readily be brought into meaningful relations. Examples are: God-Help-Death, God-Worship-Nature, God-Freedom-Fatherland. But, Spranger urges, does not each of these sets of words inevitably suggest certain lines of thought, and may not the latter, even as followed in the essay, be an expression of tradition or the social environment rather than of the living experience of the youth? And do we not thus get at best some idea of their relation to the Church and to ecclesiastical Christianity rather than of their ultimate, life-satisfying values? In part, Dehn himself realized this. So in drawing his conclusions he refrained from taking into consideration many of the essays or *Selbstzeugnisse* on the ground that they clearly bore the earmarks of traditional thought, of a perfunctory fulfilment of an essay or school requirement, of a literary group, or of sheer imagination. In the 2,400 essays received, Dehn found abundant evidence that the proletarian youth lean heavily upon the authority of what they daily hear; they think as proletarians and thus discard Christianity and all transcendent beliefs; they reflect a stage of disintegration in which, however, there are surviving traces of the past, especially in respect to various age-old ceremonials connected with crises in life, as, for example, baptism, dedication, wedding, burial.

If we further adhere to methodology as our primary guiding thread in presenting some connected account of the more important recent work in the psychology of religion, we may next refer to three American writers. Stratton has published another significant study of the spirit revealed in the sacred writings of the more developed religions, presenting in this instance, partly through a disclosure of contrasts and antitheses, the rôle therein of anger (60). The book is both interesting and valuable, though it suffers from a failure to distinguish anger from its compounds, from its sublimations and from related emotions. The concluding section insists on "both the possibility and the need of bringing our anger-responses into the service of the interests that deserve to be supreme, and in particular of making pugnacity obedient to good-will." Leuba, through a new publisher, has brought out a second edition of his *The Belief in*

God and Immortality (34). This study represents pioneer work in the application of statistical methods to the subject of religious beliefs; it brings out forcibly the differences, as respects both origin and function, between an earlier or primary conception of survival after death and that which later took form; and it contends for the essential independence of morality as respects the religious beliefs under discussion. Starbuck (as appears in the printed outlines of his Oslo lectures) has essayed the task of securing correlations exhibiting evaluations, singly and collectively, of the interacting elements in combinations of relations, as, *e.g.*, in the case of "conservatives" as distinguished from "radicals" and of the "mystical" as distinguished from the "practical-minded" types in religion. Butler, we might here inject, has pointed out that the ecclesiastical historian would be greatly aided if psychologists would throw light on the religious genius and his influence through a study of contemporary leaders who are winning converts (14).

Combining the historical approach with psychological analysis, Delacroix (18. Special review in this Journal, 20, 1925) has set forth the main types of religious faith and their connected experiences, describing both their structure and their evolution. He distinguishes three types: implicit or authoritative, reasoning, and trusting faith. Into correspondence therewith he places institution, reason and sentiment, all three of which he deems essential to religion. Desire is involved: it leads to belief in the realization of its end. Also subconscious emotion: it confers upon the object the quality of transcendence. Also thought: it is represented by belief in an objective order of forces or powers. From desire and belief spring ritual, whence comes the more or less independent myth and later the dogma. Thought moves from the primitive conception of a diffused impersonal force to deities that become progressively individualized, only to be absorbed into an anonymous, infinite being. Dogma, arising from the effort of faith to understand itself, first lays claim to explanatory significance and then becomes mystery.

Hofmann (29)—as likewise Hirsch (24)—contends that religion is essentially an experience of salvation. The feeling of dependence, so often stressed as the essence of religion, is for him characteristic only of religious need and thus of the initial, or the negative, stage of the total experience. Succeeding it is a new feeling and attitude wherein experience acquires a positive emotional value—the stage of salvation. This may come through an alteration in one's estimation of the environing order; or, through a changed orientation in one's

demands and desires; or, through a realization that one's weal is not dependent upon the external order and a conviction that one has adequate inner resources for the longed for bliss. In each of these cases there are sub-types. For example, there is self-salvation through the denial of but also through the dominance over the world. Spranger similarly describes religion as a quest for the central and total meaning of life and personality in its deeper relations with the world. Studying adolescence he concludes that this is not a collection of unrelated tendencies but a striving for a total meaning, in the various phases of which we have a "reflection of the divine in the soul and an irradiation of the discovered God into the world" (55, p. 326).

Continuing with Spranger, it should be noted that in his discussion he treats separately religious development (a) within a moderate religious atmosphere, (b) within an intense religious atmosphere, and (c) within an atmosphere religiously indifferent or hostile, at least in the Christian sense of these terms. Clavier has made careful observations regarding the ideas of God among children (15). Discussing the religious sentiment more generally, Bovet has set forth in an original manner a thesis once enunciated by G. Stanley Hall to the effect that love towards God is a development of filial love (10). As regards both the moral and the mystical or emotional aspects of religion, Bovet holds that children are capable of amazingly lofty experiences, bizarre as may be their ideas of God.

Regarding prayer as the central phenomenon of religion, Heiler has devoted to its interpretation an enormous volume that strikingly exhibits the typical German scholar's delight in thoroughness and completeness as regards detail, distinctions, and bibliographical references (23). A lucid essay designed more especially "to dispute the negative conclusion of some psychological and psycho-analytical theories regarding the objective validity of—the prayer-life" has been contributed by Relton (22). The book by Stolz must be classed not among the contributions to science but among the efforts to assist thoughtful people "in the discovery of those prayer values which will further adjustment to the expanding universe of to-day" (59).

Pratt has urged the importance of distinguishing two types of conversion: the emotional type and that in which the center of the struggle is life's chief values and something much more objective is sought than a mere emotional change (44). Langley (32) insists that the marked changes in attitude that characterize the "genuine" experience remain inadequately explained if we keep to the stand-

point of inherited conative processes functioning within empirically observable situations. Lutoslawski (37) writes of (a) superficial conversion—exemplified by most revival cases, explicable by external suggestion of some sort, and short-lived—and (b) genuine conversion. The latter shows individual characteristics differing in particular cases. It is fairly enduring in its effects. Moreover, it is explicable only by reference to a higher Power, for while a certain preparation is a necessary precondition this is not its real cause. To understand such conversion, therefore, we do better to study its consequences than its causes. Northridge (42) reaches parallel conclusions in his discussion of the types of evangelism.

On the basis of reports from Protestant missionaries, Allier (2) has written of conversion as this takes place in connection with missionary work among uncivilized peoples. Three divisions of the treatise deal with preliminary steps to conversion, the conversion crisis, and consequences which follow the crisis.

Baillie (5) holds that "when you get behind religious ideas, you also, and by the same sign, get behind religious feelings"; that the sentimentalist, mystical and experience theologies (the three varieties of romanticism), in endeavoring to escape the absurdities of rationalism, fall into a similar pit; that no "interpretation of religion can be worthy of its great object . . . which does not exhibit it as a thing born of, and nourished by, the fullest daylight of human intelligence." Brotherston (12), on the other hand, accepts a directive or formative impulse which, not deposited by experience but included in man's instinctive equipment, progressively asserts itself by way of governing the specific instincts and thus effecting a unification of life. At times we are reminded of Marshall's *Instinct and Reason*. Yet man's instinctive equipment is further described as "interrelated part with part and unified within the scope of one most general instinct", and this is obviously in acceptance of Hocking (25) to whom indeed Brotherston himself refers. Lidgett (36) argues that the various instincts and affections "*as experienced* are partial manifestations of, and *as intellectually represented* are abstractions from, a spiritual potentiality which, though undeveloped at the outset, contains within itself the promise of the religious sentiment. When ultimately this sentiment is developed it gains the power, not only of transcending the whole content of human affections from which it has become differentiated, but of returning to control and organize into a higher unity all the affective elements which for the ordinary purposes of human life have been drawn off from the central stream of spiritual

life." Very different indeed is the portrayal of religion in terms of that conception of sentiment, which we owe primarily to Shand and McDougall. Such a description and the resulting doctrines represent the most valuable part of the psychological section of Wright's book (69); and in a recent paper (70) the same writer has further refined his analysis and has indicated the resulting psychological definitions of righteousness, temptation, sin, repentance, forgiveness, atonement, grace, etc.

Shailer Mathews (39) has put theology within the setting of social psychology. In distinction from philosophy, which is an unofficial and an individual interpretation, theology, he believes, is an expression of group belief, and its meanings must therefore be sought by reference to social origins. For it is derived from customs and ritual which antedate doctrines and, not strangely, its terms are social "patterns". It is therefore functional in nature, and the value of its formulas must be determined by reference to whether or not they promote the group life. Sacraments are treated from a similar functional and genetic viewpoint by Cooke (16). Such also, of course, has been Ames's approach, leading to his conception of religion as "the consciousness of the highest social values." This definition has been sharply criticized by Pratt (44, pp. 8ff) on the ground that it identifies religion with social righteousness. Leuba (35) has also warned against the identification of religion with moral or social devotion. Are there not important psychological differences in attitude between adherents of organized religions and devoted atheistical servants of society? Ames (3) has replied that by "consciousness" (in his definition) he means both appreciation and the active attitude of supporting, and by "highest" the most intimate and vital phases of the social consciousness, these phases, of course, being relative to the social group. And, he asks, has not religion in our modern age become identical with social idealism and with morality? He declares himself ready to include in his account of religion—as does Pratt—an attitude toward an ultimate Determiner of Destiny, provided only some specific empirical content be given this expression. Indeed this content varies. It may be rice, corn, bear, sheep, God in the form of a man or a king, or many another thing. But "whatever the symbol, the substance of the idea of God, the objective reality, is the Spirit of the group whose awesome will is enforced through the commandments of social custom." To the charge that this implies subjectivism and mere idea-ism, Ames retorts: Is Alma Mater a mere idea of fiction? Is it subjective? Has

it not all the reality of buildings, faculties, donors, students, etc. In a later paper (4) he argues similarly that "when the idea of God is employed it implies a particular organization of reality in terms of the felt values of experience."

These contentions, reminiscent, among other thinkers, of Comte and Natorp, have evoked a number of noteworthy responses. To Baillie they suggest by reaction the very point at which religion, as he believes, carries one beyond a purely humanistic or social attitude. This "something more" he finds in the assurance that in our finest social attitudes and moral endeavors "we somehow have the very Heart and Soul of things with us and are aligning ourselves with the Eternal" (5, p. 110). "The highest outlook and attitude are those which take our values, not as inventions, but rather as revelations; as our best and most veridical clues to the nature of the System to which we belong; as representing not merely our purposes but the Universe's Purpose for us; as being not merely a meaning which we import into our lives, but rather a meaning which we find in them" (5, p. 111f).

Very penetratingly Hocking has argued that the group spirit is not even for practical purposes equivalent to God (26). Our present society is not an organism, nor is it ideal; it is only progressing toward such; from its demands upon the individual, its powers and enforcements, there is always, factually or potentially, an appeal to another spirit. Thus the spirit of one's social order is never absolute. It is at best somewhat external, undiscerning, and lacking in appreciation and understanding of the moral and spiritual needs of the individual. In respect to the vicissitudes and experiences of the latter it is the function of God "to do better" than the social group of which the individual is a member. Again, "if there be in the universe an object upon which there can be reliance *without criticism*, a *valid* object of worship, and a source of *peace*, that object must be other than the social good" (p. 487). Further, "perhaps the most practical of all religious functions has been its function of assuring individual minds that they may and should aspire without limit; that in the real world the will is concretely free. But if religion is to do this, it must involve the whole sweep of the objects of the mind that worships, and not any finite part of them. But the social spirit is a very finite portion of the cosmos" (p. 487f). The argument is strengthened by reference to the fact that in religion "the worshipper seeks response and one that is individual" and by reference also to salient features of the course of religion's development.

A fundamental difficulty from which we constantly tend to suffer, Hocking has elsewhere pointed out (27), is that when we think about religion we usually naturalize it, whereas religion is of a nature such as resists being naturalized. Worship does indeed promote useful social ends. Its function, however, is not exclusively utilitarian. It demands a metaphysical object. To leave it with merely psychological attitudes or social tasks would be "illicitly to naturalize it".

Ackerman (1) tells us that "religion not only subscribes to and sanctions the best morality, but moral character itself *is* religion objectified and realized." Antipodal hereto is the position represented by Stavenhagen's insistence on the total disparateness of ethical and religious values. That which should be distinguished and denoted by the term "sin," for example, is, he argues, in no wise the concern of ethics, even in the widest sense of this discipline (Cf. 58, pp. 188ff). Sin signifies either lack of an absolute personal attitude or the possession of such an attitude in an inadequate measure, as regards either the depth or the range of the experience. One may sin only in respect to God, as absolute being. The doctrine is connected with a conception of religion which stresses the "numinous," "absolute mystery," "creature feeling," "*majesta tremenda*" and thus, in spite of differences which Stavenhagen points out, leans heavily upon Rudolf Otto (43). This profound writer has likewise insisted upon the unique character of the category of "the holy." The following are, according to Otto, the salient features of religion: "awefulness," "inward shuddering," culminating in the higher religions in the experiences of the "holy"; "creature feeling" with the correlative experience of "overpoweringness"; "urgency" or "energy" as expressed, for example, in the ideas of the "wrath" of God and the mystic's reference to the "consuming flame" of the divine love; incomprehensibility, incommensurability with the world of everyday experience, with imagination and with conception; "fascination," the impulse to approach the divine, to commune with the divine, to possess and to be possessed by it, to be saved. The attainment called salvation, unlike morality and goodness, cannot be "understood" or satisfactorily described. To the secular mind and outlook it is unintelligible. Stavenhagen objected to Otto's impassable gulf between the numinous and the rational. Bennett (8) urges the same point and seeks further to vindicate the essential unity of the spirit by healing the breach between the holy and the moral. "Since the numinous evidently implies some constraint, however mysterious, upon the conduct of the natural man, it is so far moral," Moreover,

"moral obligation contains an element of mystery which is of a piece with religious awe" (p. 465). As for religious intuition, it "lives the death of reason as reason lives the death of intuition"; it is "a node in an alternating process through which conceptual knowledge must pass, a point of concentration which it reaches only to leave behind" (p. 469). Martin (38) has likewise recognized that religion represents something unique, irreducible to morality, philosophy, or art. Its quality is that of mystery—save only to a psychoanalyst! Its ideas are not to be regarded as factual descriptions but as symbols and expressions of inner unrest, of repressed emotions and wishes acquiring a characteristic form of release. Religion generally espouses the popularly approved morality. But there is nothing in its own nature to determine the direction it will go, and thus the question whether or not a revival of religion would be desirable depends upon the nature of the ideals to which it would probably attach itself.

Pratt (44, cf. p. 196) assigns to anthropology the questions of origin whereas Mueller-Freienfels (41) devotes practically all of the first of his two small volumes in the Goeshen series to the origin of religion. The second of these booklets deals with myths and cults. With the particular forms of these and with the specific influences that have been operative in individual cases, the psychologist indeed, as the author sees it, has no concern, but only the anthropologist and the historian. Yet the psychologist alone can speak authoritatively regarding the universal springs in which the particular phenomena have their ultimate source. He must determine what basic needs are met. In any case he is on the search for psychological laws in order that he may exhibit facts in their psychological necessity. Runze's scholarly and richly documented treatise (49) likewise stresses the problem of origins. His treatment and conclusions are of the most catholic sort, recognizing, in a manner admirably exemplified in Leuba's *A Psychological Study of Religion*, that most theories have erred primarily in their denials and in their exclusiveness, and that a genuinely empirical outlook compels one to admit at the roots of religious beliefs and practices many influences of very diverse sorts.

Of the general treatises recently published that of Pratt (44) is of outstanding value. Eclectic as to the methods of acquiring and of interpreting relevant facts, it throughout exhibits a clear consciousness of precisely what is being attempted and accomplished, and in the course of the well organized volume practically all the major problems (save those of origins) receive at least passing discussion. Wunderle's introduction (71) is interesting as coming

from a Catholic author whose thought is based on that of St. Augustine. Among the British publications we call attention to Selbie's useful handbook (53. Special review in this number of the BULLETIN), obviously reflecting the influences of Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness* but in critical places rather seriously lacking in clear definition and scientific analysis; and to a somewhat more original introduction in which the author, R. H. Thouless (64), utilizes a moderate psychoanalytic psychology. Much more extreme, and decidedly less convincing, is the book by E. D. Martin (38).

It is remarkable how many efforts have been made to show in what ways the findings of psychology may be put to the service of religion. The Dean of Chester's discussion of "Coue and His Gospel of Health" is only one among the many publications that continue the early writings of Worcester and McComb on the relation of religion to medicine and to health. We would mention especially the books by Pym (46, 47) and Brooks (11). Writing in a similar vein Barry (6) has advanced the thesis that belief in God is a psychological necessity if the mind is to be completely unified. Very often it is pointed out that recent advances in psychology "have put new instruments in the hands of all those who seek to influence the minds and hearts of men" and that "no pastor of Christ's flock should consider himself adequately equipped for the work until he has gained some real acquaintance with the more important developments of modern psychology" (Matthews, 22, p. 25). The view is shared by the other contributors to the cooperative volume (Special review in this number of the BULLETIN).

No less common, however, is the caution that the psychology of religion may be to religion a very dangerous ally. Much attention has therefore been paid to elucidating the limitations of any psychological approach. To cull more or less at random: Barry (6) insists that psychology, as a science, is limited to a discovery of *how* things happen, leaving the question regarding the *why* to philosophy and theology; that origin must not be identified with value or be substituted for it; that a dismissal of the Object of religion on the ground of its psychological and social origin is as though modern science were declared illusory because of its source in magic and superstitions. He even ventures the assertion that the personality of God—indeed, "something very much like Christian Theism"—is the only basis upon which one can render psychological findings explicable; that "unless the Christian faith is true, psycho-therapy," for example, "itself collapses" (pp. 174ff). Northridge (42) reconciles psycho-

logical truths and their practical value with religious doctrines by distinguishing between the *immediate* and the *ultimate* causes of religious experience; moreover, natural laws "have themselves to be explained" and "in themselves require agencies to use them and cannot be identified with these agencies." Matthews (22) adduces the probable shortcomings of introspection in general; the limited nature, not of the *range* of the phenomena studied by psychology, but of the *questions raised about* these phenomena; and the restriction of science to description as distinct from explanation. Similar views impel Price (45) to the conclusion that the psychology of religion can neither prove nor disprove any religious interpretation of life and that it therefore requires supplementation by philosophy and theology. Referring to the alleged contention of Leuba that the psychology of religion disposes of transcendental causes and to the antipodal theses of Pratt and of Wright, he maintains that this science can take note only of the human, psychical aspect of the experience process, and that any activity on the part of God could by the very nature of its inquiry not come within its purview. Hudson (30), likewise misunderstanding Leuba, breaks a lance with him over the same issue. He insists that laws of nature are but descriptions, after observation of the facts, of how things happen and that they therefore explain nothing; they merely describe and dissect the mechanism of experience—they cannot decide as to ultimate origin or validity. Touching the thesis that God, immortality, the idea of a Savior, etc., are but "imaginary projections" he retorts by asking how the proponent of such a view rules out the possibility that his own opinion of religion is but a projection of his own weakness. Hudson takes his stand with those theologians who declare that religious experience does not contain its own sufficient evidence but that if it is "to be ascribed confidently to the God in whom Christians believe it must correspond in nature, significance and results with what on other grounds the Church teaches and believes about the character of God and his dealings with men." These other grounds are primarily historical, and the author admits that if they were undermined he would feel compelled to admit the possibility that his "own spiritual experience was simply the creation of his own mind strengthened through herd instinct, and so on, by the (equally deluded) religion of other people" (p. 123). Rose (48) is of the opinion that Leuba expected more from the psychology of religion than "simply an ordering of the bare facts considered from the abstract point of view inherent in all science" and that when he

met, as one must in such a search, with disappointment, he assumed the quest for God to be ended. Rose then argues for the necessity of admitting transcendental causes.

Staehlin (56) seems at first blush to oppose those who contend that the psychology of religion is not concerned with the question of the truth of religion. What he really comes to say, however, is that psychology must describe and analyze the way in which the believer *experiences* the truth-claim of his religion. On the other hand, he holds that this claim is not the essential feature of religious experience. Religion, for him, is life, and life lays no further claim than that of being real and of being life.

Sheldon (54) deals succinctly and independently with many of these contentions when he argues to negative answers to the following five questions: (1) "Does psychology cover so large a province as to leave no truly distinctive field or function to philosophy?" (2) "Is there good historic warrant for defining religion as the consciousness of social values, or as the recognition and pursuit of social values, thus leaving out of the definition all explicit reference to a felt relationship to a Higher Power?" (3) "Have arguments for the existence of God so small a measure of cogency as is assumed by some exponents of the psychology of religion?" (4) "Do psychological data involve any proper occasion or demand to negate the conception of positive revelation?" (5) "Is there reason for believing that a religion can be made to work successfully which ignores the idea of God and stresses simply a human striving for the good of society on an earthly theatre?"

Within psychology there have been strong tendencies to reject the distinctively psychic, or to think of the mind as ruled wholly by the body or as dominated by sexual passion, or to consider it a machine. Where has this left religion? The preponderance of opinion as represented by the publications of the past five or six years would seem to converge in the direction of Stratton's reply (61) that "psychology leaves religion living, with new means for its great work and with fresh confidence in the naturalness and the need of the religious life. It is of help in pointing out religion's place and function, distinguishing it from art, science, and social (including political) reorganization."

Concerning the present status of the psychology of religion the present writer has written elsewhere (50). A recent account of the history and the methodology of the science with particular reference to the developments in Germany has been furnished by Koepp (31).

Two papers relating to the history of the science and the work done in America have recently been published by the writer of this survey (51, 52).

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RELIGION AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

A Bibliographical Survey

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The literature on religion and psychoanalysis has already attained considerable proportions. The present study is based on a survey of seventy-eight different titles. Aside from general works treating or touching the subject, several divisions of the field can be discriminated.

Much of the material is concerned with anthropology, mythology, folklore, customs and ceremonials. That myths are the dreams of peoples, just as dreams are the myths of individuals has, with the psychoanalysts, become axiomatic. The same processes of association, conscious or unconscious, which operate in dreams are asserted to be similarly operative in neuroses, myths and rituals.

Another division of the field may be called the exegetic. To this division belong the psychoanalytic dissections of celebrated Biblical passages.

Another department could be named the biographical. Here we meet the studies of Zinzendorf, Margaretha Ebner, Denys the Areopagite, Suso, Catherine of Siena, and other outstanding mystics.

Perhaps another division, just beginning to evolve, is that which might be dominated the pragmatic, imparting insights that admit of application in practical religious work.

While some of the output is sane and plausible, much impresses the reader as freakish and bizarre. Feelings rather than findings are constantly coming to the fore. This is particularly characteristic of the writers hostile to religion. Whatever scientific merit their pronouncements may possess is often vitiated by their intense bias. Nothing produced thus far satisfies the need mentioned by Thouless—"a series of psychoanalyses of religious persons directed toward the elucidation of this problem" (78, p. 138).

It will facilitate our survey to disengage three distinct aspects of this highly variegated subject matter: (1) The Libidinous, including the Infantile, (2) The Pathological, (3) The Therapeutic.

I. THE LIBIDINOUS (INCLUDING THE INFANTILE)

The attitude of the child toward its parents protracted, under various disguises, into later life is taken to account for many of the religious reactions (24, p. 57; 36, p. 254; 4, pp. 40, 247; 38). God is everywhere the Heavenly Father. Martin quotes such hymn passages as: "Father, I cry to Thee," "He leadeth me, oh blessed thought, oh words with heavenly comfort fraught," "I'm the child of a King," "Hold Thou my hand, dear Lord" (42, p. 127). Moxon asserts that "God is the unconscious desire for parental authority" (45), while Bovet traces, in a manner both beautiful and convincing, the development, step by step, from infantile reliance to spirituality (7, p. 25).

Invoking erotic factors, intense religious sentiment in certain women is ascribed to strong paternal attachment, sometimes called "the Electra complex" (36, p. 55; 78, p. 254; 28). Mlle. Vé, described by Flournoy, is considered a case in point. Her peace-bringing "Presence" is attributed, among other things, to "the idealised memory of her father" (78, p. 254). Thérèse Françoise Martin is said to have effected through her phantasies of Jesus, the Virgin, the Devil, etc., "a complete identification with the mother or even with the mother's genital organ" enabling her unconsciously to scheme incestuous relations with her father without risking maternal hostility (13).

Both Jung and Martin attribute to the Father-God image the function of smoothing the individual's transition from the sheltered state of childhood to the stern exactions of maturity (42, p. 125; 76, p. 155; 36, p. 47). Elsewhere, these childhood regressions are treated with disparagement. "A state of infantile dependence," "infantile morality based on commandments" are among the phrases of censure employed (45, p. 97; 42, p. 333).

Trust and affection, however, are not the only responses aroused in the child by the parent. Feelings of a reverse tenor are sometimes evoked. "Ambivalence" is the psychoanalytic word for this phenomenon, whereby the same person can awaken sentiments of hostility and disgust as well as those of love and admiration. The mythical hero, according to Rank, objectifies this sense of parental ambivalence, each of the various heroes—Sargon, Moses, Karna, Œdipus, Paris, Romulus, Hercules, Jesus, Lohengrin and the rest—having had two sets of parents, real parents of regal or exalted station and foster parents of lowly rank (59). In like manner, chil-

dren are said to phantasy true parental connections more pleasing than the existing ones with their corrections and restraints. The hero, according to psychoanalysis is, of course, the projection of the individual's own wishes just as God is the projection of his ideals (36, p. 231; 42, pp. 138, 215; 77, chap. 13).

Bovet surmises that an important factor leading the adolescent to transfer his devotions from the earthly to the heavenly Father is the discovery of the earthly father's shortcomings (7, p. 47). Chief of these, from the youthful viewpoint, is that of sexual practice; hence the obliteration of all sex implications from the Father-God image (42, p. 120). "What the religious interest strives to do," says Martin, "is to preserve intact an infantile image of the ideal father, perfect and pure and sinless" (42, pp. 148, 149). When the purgation is not complete, God becomes the "dread Father" (42, p. 151; 3, p. 308). Pfister reports the case of a neurotic who, from that cause, hated God (48, p. 332). Martin hints that the forgiveness which God is supposed to grant may, at times, be a "displacement" for the forgiveness which God—that is, the reminiscence of a faulty human father—needs (42, p. 142). Atheism, radicalism and various forms of negativism are asserted to be traceable to the father aversion (48, p. 137).

Out of the segregated evil traits of the earthly father, fancy, in fact, creates a new being—the devil. The devil is the "bad Father." He is "the Old Harry," "the Old Nick," "the Bad Man," "the Old Boy Himself" (48, p. 138). The devil's horns and tail are phallic symbols associated with the sex urge (33, pp. 84, 86). Jones has worked out an elaborate theory according to which the devil consists of traits that have been subtracted from the original God (Who, like the earthly father, is a composite of good and bad) in order to have a God Who is righteousness unalloyed (33, chap. 6).

The chief cause of filial antipathy is said to lie in the restraints exercised upon the child chiefly in sexual matters. These involve "castration threats" and, above all, the *Œdipus* complex.

Some writers contrive to find in the *Œdipus* situation of primitive times and in the *Œdipus* complex of all ages, the origin and essence of every conceivable religious belief and practice. In the primitive horde, the sons, impelled by the sex urge, are presumed to have combated the father who was the sole possessor of the available females. Often the killing of the father would result and this would be followed by remorse, tender feelings and hostile colliding. All of the ancient sacrificial systems as well as the Eucharist of the Chris-

tians, the Shofar and Kol Nidre of the Jews and the virgin birth doctrines of various cults have been connected with that *Ursünde*.

The contention is that the sacrificial animal was originally the reincarnation of the father; neurologists to-day encounter in the dreams of their patients similar identifications of the father with a dog or a horse. Honoring the animal as a totem meant honoring and thus placating the murdered parent. Slaying the animal at the altar was at once the symbolic representation of the ominous deed and, at the same time, a process of appropriating the father's prowess.

According to Storfer, the Œdipus complex is the "*völkerpsychologische Triebkraft des Marienmythus*" (75, p. 132). To substantiate this, Storfer finds a sexual significance in every one of a vast array of folk views and practices. The resurrection as well as the ascension means *Erection*. The priestly benediction represents coitus; the upraised hand or fingers being surrogates for the masculine sex organ. Tapers, voice, tongue, breath, words, rain, wings, branches, scepter, sword, ark, ship, book, donkey, hammer, cross, etc., are respectively either masculine or feminine sex *indicia*, all of them masking the wish to displace the father and appropriate the mother. The Annunciation in which, according to some legends, Gabriel is identical with Christ himself, also signifies cohabitation, the tongue of the speaker being the male organ and the ear of the listener, the female. Storfer recognizes no limits to sex implications.

The most voluminous exponent of the Œdipus theory of religious origins is Reik. The nocturnal wrestling of Jacob at the end of Genesis, chapter 32, is, with Reik, a distorted reminiscence of the primordial patricide. Jacob's injured thigh refers to the castration practiced or simulated upon primitive youth at their initiation and harks back ultimately to the son's aggressions upon the father's sex prerogatives (63). Just as the primitive son slew and succeeded the father, Moses is, in the golden calf story (Exodus 32 and 33), the slayer and successor of Jahweh. The breaking of the tablets and the shattering of the idol are "displacements" signifying the deicide, while the radiant countenance of Moses or rather, as conceived by the Vulgate and by Michael Angelo, the horns are the badge of his divine succession; Jahweh, like the primordial father who prefigured him, having been identified with a bull. The horns are also connected with the phallus as the symbol of masculine strength (61, pp. 269, 301). Habakkuk's "Let all the earth keep silent before Him" recalls the pall of silence that rested upon the parricides after the revolting deed. "Sie verurtheilen sich dann gleichsam selbst zum

Tode." Reik thinks of our own silence in the presence of the dead (63). The intent of the commandment prohibiting plastic or pictorial representations of Jahweh is understood by Reik to be that of protecting the Deity against the patricidal inclinations of his own children. According to primitive notions, one need only harm an image in order to harm the original (61, p. 229).

Reik traces hymnology to an imitation of the envied or the dying father or perhaps of the animal which was assumed to incarnate the father. Dancing and subsequently prayer gestures go back to such animal simulations (61, p. 249). Reik does not hesitate to link with the prehistoric patricide the modern Jewish compunctions about vows and oaths. The original oath, he holds, was a promise to refrain thereafter from killing God, the father: but, by a process having familiar neurotic parallels, the unconscious impulse to break the oath generated an overcompensation, that is, an excessive scruple about observing that which there was a tremendous unconscious proclivity to violate (61, p. 163).

According to the searching study by Kielholz, Boehme's theological musings amount to a "*herbeigewünschter Inzest mit der Mutter und Beseitigungswunsch gegenüber den Vater*" (37).

The general purport of religion seems nevertheless to have been the combating of the Œdipus complex (36, pp. 294, 295). The crucifixion story and the various tales of battles between heroes and dragons are asserted to mean at bottom the renunciation of the incest yearning (36, p. 410, and chap. 5). The ultimate significance of all renunciation of a religious practice is, according to Berguer, that of overcoming the patricidal desire (4, p. 157). Jones equates the unpardonable sin of Mark 3, 29—blaspheming the Holy Ghost—with mother incest wishes (34, p. 423). This same writer sees in the tonsure, celibacy, robes, etc., of the Catholic priests equivalents of the ancient castration practices and believes them inseparable from the Mariolatry of the Catholic church. In the absence of Mary, the mother, there is no further need of these castration substitutes; hence their discontinuance in the Protestant confessions (34, p. 430).

Even aside from the Œdipus complex, the mother, according to psychoanalysis, figures prominently in religious origins.

"Backward, turn backward, O time in your flight;
Make me a child again just for to-night,"

could well serve as the text for much that psychoanalysts have propounded. The Biblical longings for a return to Jerusalem mean at

bottom, according to Martin, a return to the mother and to the sense of peace and security for the infant which the mother's presence ensures (42, p. 237). The Biblical paradise is also construed as a wish for a "return to the mother" (42, p. 97). Especially is the widespread concept of a rebirth associated with that desire to be a child again. Baptism signifies such a rebirth (42, pp. 206, 292). The baptismal water is, according to some, the amniotic fluid and a parallel to the "shining canal" (*i.e.*, birth) dreams of neurotics (36, pp. 252, 254, 356; 4, pp. 56, 157, 188; 76, p. 148). Jung says: "That the meaning underlying the church is that of the mother's womb can scarcely be doubted" (36, p. 380). The ark of the covenant; the ark of Moses, etc., are also akin to the womb; similarly the grave in which Christ was laid (4, p. 118). Other sacred equivalents of the mother are the Madonna and the Holy Ghost while the harlot of Babylon is a malevolent offshoot of the mother as the devil is of the father (34, p. 427). More readily acceptable is Bove's position that, while the rudimentary religious attitude is the child's attachment to the mother, God gets to be pictured as a father because the human father represents the first step in the enlargement of the child's horizon beyond its mother into the world (7, p. 49).

Yet the Oedipus complex and the cognate wish for the mother do not exhaust the erotic elements which psychoanalysis unearths. A number of writers, particularly Schroeder and Fielding, can see in religion nothing except sex. "All religion," says Schroeder, "in its differential essence, is only a sex ecstasy seldom recognised to be that and therefore easily and actually misinterpreted as a mysterious and transcendental or superphysical indiscriminating witness to the inerrancy of all those varying and often contradictory doctrines and ceremonies believed to be of superphysical value in the promotion of present material, ecstatic or postmortem well-being" (67, *Psychan. Rev.*, 1, p. 148). Jung contends that "mystic scenes of union with the Saviour generally are intermingled with an enormous amount of sexual libido" (36, p. 323). Andreas Salome surmises a connection between the sexual sources of things and God regarded as the divine source (2, p. 466). Levy has an acute and fairly persuasive analysis identifying the forbidden fruit of Genesis with sexuality (41). Storfer finds simulations of coitus in the various prayer postures—closed eyes, outspread arms, etc. (75, p. 36). Martin calls attention to the erotic *motifs* in hymns: "Let me to Thy bosom fly," "Lay down thy head upon my breast," "In the arms of my dear

Saviour," etc. (42, p. 73). Riggall, who treats sex with exceptional delicacy, sees a beautiful outgrowth of sex trends in the mass and the communion service (64, p. 19). Bovet, with characteristic sanity and reverence, offers the hypothesis that all types of love, including sex love, are branchings from a common root (7).

Not rarely are sex and religion asserted to coincide through various forms of sex perversion; homosexuality, narcissism, autoerotism, masochism and sadism are predicated here in addition to the incest leanings already discussed. Jones agrees with Freud that loving one's enemies "makes a demand on social feelings that can be met . . . only from homosexual sources of feeling" (34, p. 425). Morel suspects narcissism and autoerotism in various of his introverted mystics. Zinzendorf as analyzed by Pfister displays phantasies both masochistic and sadistic as do other "strictly religious men and women" (47, p. 198; 48, pp. 412, 449, 572, 573). Swisher cautions that "the self-deprecatory, saintly meek type which formerly we met so frequently in the churches is decidedly masochistic" (76, p. 121). Martin also notices how cruelty can have an outlet in religious forms (42, p. 55). Moxon is convinced that anyone with a normal sex life "has no time or energy to spare for communion with a personal God" (45, p. 98). Pfister reports various cases in which atheism and apostasy have had sexual roots (50, p. 76; 48, p. 411).

II. THE PATHOLOGICAL ASPECT

Religion, while occasionally charged with causing neurosis, is much more commonly treated as its effect (64, p. 14; 48, p. 597; 76, p. 93; 17; 78, p. 238). Swisher contends that Paul was a neurotic and thus a melancholy contrast to Jesus who is lauded as a model of psychic normality. Swisher regrets the subsequent influence of Paul which, he claims, imbued Christianity with a decidedly neurotic hue (76, pp. 34, 39, 40). This writer detects neurosis also in the Book of Job and in the Book of Ecclesiastes (48, p. 60), while the Jewish Messiah idea he brands as "a group wish exactly analogous to the individual's neurotic desire to escape from the objective world into a self created kingdom" (48, p. 34; cf. 4, p. 35).

Likewise the negative form of religion, theological doubt, is attributed by Swisher to neurosis. Not objective circumstances but unconscious disturbances produce the restless negator (76, pp. 54, 114). "I have never found a normal person," he writes, "who was

driven to religious doubt by present difficulties nor to despair and longing for death. The normal mind does not react in that way; it recognizes that these things are part of the natural order and that we must bear them with equanimity. Why then do others despair and throw down the burden of life? The explanation is as follows: They are the victims of some vicious complex" (76, p. 54).

Religion has also been associated with various conflicts and compulsions not specifically diagnosed as neurotic. Allwohn's "*Die Ehe des Propheten Hosea*" in a fascinating study of conflict between Hosea's sensuousness and his ideals (1); while compulsion, according to Freud and to Martin, obtains in various forms of ceremonial punctiliousness (25; 42, pp. 166, 281, 283).

A strikingly conspicuous rôle has been played in many of these studies by the concept of introversion. The word is usually employed as synonymous with "neurosis" or, at least, a condition approximating such. Like Swisher, Riggall complains that many teachers of religion are of the "introverted shut-in type" (76, p. 229; 64, p. 14). Morel's entire volume is an "*Essai sur l'Introversion Mystique*." Moxon is unable to perceive in religion anything but a "psychical flight from a dark and threatening reality and a turning of men's love toward imaginary objects" (45, p. 96).

Opposed to these views are two distinct contentions which are themselves opposed to one another. First, there are those who flatly identify religion with extroversion. Then there are those who grant that religion is introversionistic but who regard a certain measure of introversion as healthful. According to Berguer, the temptation toward introversion was precisely the temptation that Christ resisted (4, pp. 165, 173). Pfister believes that, in favorable cases, religion can guard against introversion (48, p. 412). Meanwhile, Thouless speaks of health-giving introversions (78, p. 237), while Martin emphatically pronounces a certain amount of "escape from the world" indispensable to mental health and inseparable from true religion (42, pp. 313, 323). The Church must be "in its way, a house of refuge" (42, p. 246). It weakens a church to be otherwise (42, p. 248). One of this writer's strongest grievances against "the crowd" is that through crowd psychology, "the religious group ceases to be an escape from the world and becomes one of the contending parties in the social struggle."

Among the concepts invoked by psychoanalysis to explain religion are naturally those of compromise and of rationalization. The substance of what various writers say regarding compromise is

contained in this passage from Rank and Sachs: "All the religious practices as compromise products, have a double face; their effect consists in the facilitation of the renunciation of gratification of socially hostile instincts; their essence lies in their allowing partly merely in the myth creating phantasy, partly by cultistic and ritualistic practice, the forbidden acts represented in the phantasy" (60, p. 70). Rationalization, as applied to religion, is treated by Stekel (74, p. 53), Jones (35, pp. 104, 105), Moxon (45, p. 93), Thouless (78, p. 81), and Pfister (48, p. 326). "Reason is used in religion for the confirmation of hopes that love begets," says Moxon. Thouless cites an interesting rationalization of anti-religious conclusions. A Sunday School teacher had turned Atheist, presenting cogent and well reasoned arguments for his position. Yet, the real cause of his Atheism was his girl's elopement with one of his fellow Sunday School teachers. A young man described by Pfister whose conversion to Catholicism was due to the resemblance between his mother and a certain Catholic girl rationalized his conversion by arguing the benefits of the confessional.

III. THE THERAPEUTIC ASPECT

Sometimes religion is viewed as being itself a therapeutic process. Sometimes it is treated as the incentive, sometimes as the goal and sometimes as the utilizer of the therapy. Religion, according to Thouless, offers a solution of conflicts which is better than the neurotic solution (78, p. 277). Both Freud (23, p. 5) and his American follower, Brill (11, p. 407), attribute an increase of neurosis to a decline of religion, while the Zurich school, following Jung, give religious attitudes a distinct place in their therapeutic methods (78, p. 277).

Various religious usages suggest to the psychoanalytic writers the salutary "transference" of their own technique. (42, p. 219). Swisher agrees with Coriat that "'casting the burden on the Lord' corresponds to the transference of the mental anguish from the subject to the physician in psychoanalysis" (76, p. 155). The benefits, in this connection, of the Catholic as well as of other modes of confession are debated by a number of authors. Martin works out an illuminating correspondence between "confession" in the sense of telling one's faults and "confession" in the sense of affirming a dogma (42, p. 256).

Riggal announces the aim of Jesus to have been that of relieving people's conflicts (64, p. 20); while Berguer declares that the methods

involved in the miraculous cures parallel those of psychoanalysis (4, p. 207). Pfister, following Maeder, views the "beneficent and intelligent guiding force" which resides in the unconscious as being identical with "Christ, the real physician" (49, p. 201). Pfister, in fact, calls Jesus "the first psychoanalyst" and cites Matthew 23, 9, to illustrate the relieving of a father fixation (49, p. 328). Pfister makes psychoanalysis a kind of ancillary to religion, relieving the conflicts and fixations and curing the neuroses which customary religious tactics cannot reach, yet achieving results, ethical and spiritual, at which religion aims (48, pp. 449, 450). In like vein, Swisher says: "The 'divided self' . . . may . . . require the good offices of modern psychotherapeutics rather than, or in addition to, the offices of the clergyman" (76, p. 147).

Finally there is the conspicuous place of sublimation with which both regeneration and conversion have been identified. Coriat speaks for many of his fellow analysts when he says: "As a type of emotional sublimation, religion, using the term in its broadest sense, without reference to any particular dogma, offers one of the most effective and satisfactory roots of the sublimating process (13). Bovet's entire brochure on the "*Instinct Combatif*" depicts the sublimation of the combative impulses, comparing them, in this regard, with the sex impulses, between which and the combative, Bovet suspects deep lying points of identity.

Sublimation is farther exhibited in various historical cases. Berguer construes the angels of Christ's temptation to mean the forces of sublimation (4, p. 178). Allwohn shows how the prophet Hosea passed from erotic conflict to a sublimation which produced his conception of Divine forgiving love (1). Pfister is persuaded that Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, and Jeremiah sought "a transformation of the libido into social activity" (48, p. 574).

Among the thought provoking conclusions is that of Martin who urges that our religion can be of a satisfactory character only as we "lift the meaning of religious practices into consciousness." "Religion," he says, "is not destroyed by being made conscious: it merely approaches art" (42, p. 57). Also stimulating are Swisher's views about a new practical orientation in religion. Like Pfister, Swisher holds that psychoanalysis should belong to the minister's training. "The psychoanalytically trained teacher," he says, "can guide his pupil through the tortuous mazes of doubt and fear and help him resolve his conflicts and bring him to sublimation in a true conversion" (76, p. 225).

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION AS SEEN BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

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- J. NEEDHAM, Ed. *Science, Religion and Reality*. N. Y.: Macmillan, 1925. Pp. 396.
W. B. SELBIE. *The Psychology of Religion*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. 310.
O. HARDMAN, Ed. *Psychology and the Church*. N. Y.: Macmillan Company, 1925. Pp. 203.

It would not be necessary to go very far back in order to find the first book published in England on the psychology of religion; but during the last few years such books have come out in surprising numbers. In addition to the three listed above, which, together with Thouless' *Introduction to the Psychology to Religion* (reviewed in this JOURNAL), are the most important, there has been published since 1922, *Psychology and the Christian Life*, by T. W. PYM, 1922; *Christianity and Psychology*, by F. R. BARRY, 1923; *The Psychology of the Christian Life and Behavior*, by W. S. BRUCE, 1923; and *Recent Psychology and Evangelistic Preaching*, by W. L. NORTH- RIDGE, 1924.

These books (with the exception of some chapters of *Science, Religion and Reality*) are not first-hand scientific studies; they do not add anything to our knowledge of religion. They are rather restatements with amendments and criticisms, aiming mainly at making the psychology of religion agree with a widely accepted religious point of view. They express, therefore, not so much a genuine scientific interest as a concern for the safety of "Religion," whatever that word may mean. This dominant purpose accounts for the fact that these books are not written by psychologists but by theologians, clergymen, philosophers, and even by persons without any appropriate preparation of any kind. The situation of the psychology of religion is very much the same in the United States. As a matter of fact, the last three years have not anywhere been fruitful in scientific research in that field.

It should be observed that the psychology of religion, which

several of these volumes are mainly intent upon setting right, is the Freudian psychology of religion. The reader cannot fail to notice that the Freudian treatment of religion has been a main incentive in the preparation of several of these books. Selbie, for instance, devotes some pages to it in his first chapter, discusses it in the fourth, under the title "The Unconscious in Religious Experience," and returns to it in the last.

Science, Religion and Reality is a valuable volume of essays prepared by a committee of English philosophers, theologians, and scientists under the chairmanship of Dean Inge. It reveals in an uncommonly significant way the trend of opinion in England regarding the nature of religion and its relation to science. To the psychologist the interest of the book lies mainly in the discussion of the field and the possible limitations of science, and in its relations to a naturalistic philosophy on the one hand and to a spiritualistic philosophy on the other. Especial attention is deserved by the essays entitled, "Mechanistic Biology and the Religious Consciousness," by Joseph Needham, a biochemist; "The Sphere of Religion," by Principal John W. Oman, Lecturer in the philosophy of religion; and by the "Conclusion" by Dean Inge. Other papers on magic, science and religion and on the relation of science and religion at different historical periods are of a more remote interest to the psychological student.

The purpose of the committee was not merely a theoretical one. In addition to setting forth the present state of the relation of religion and science, they wanted also to indicate possible terms of peace or a *modus vivendi* between them. It is Dean Inge's judgment that the volume may well incline one "to feel confident that a reconciliation is much nearer than it seemed to be fifty years ago" (347). Lord Balfour in his "Introduction" utters a similar opinion (4). With this opinion the other contributors to this and the other volumes here reviewed seem to agree. The conclusion that between "true" science and "true" religion there is no conflict is one of the curious because meaningless features of the recent writings in England and the United States on the subject of science and religion.

Apart from the desire that it be so, this conviction has a double source. On the one hand many scientific men of the highest rank no longer regard a naturalistic, mechanistic, philosophy as being required by scientific knowledge; and, on the other hand—and this is the source which mainly interests us—the philosophers, theologians,

and scientists who come to the rescue of "religion," do it at the expense of *the religions*. They sacrifice the latter in order to save the former. For, the feature characteristic of all the established religions, embodied in all the forms assumed by organized worship, is not included in "religion" as defended by most of these authors. That feature is a belief in one or several superhuman Beings with whom man is in direct social relations, *i.e.*, Beings who are moved to action by man's needs and by his offerings and supplications.

That which these people argue for is often nothing more than a spiritualistic philosophy, and that which they attack is not science but a philosophical conception of the universe frequently entertained by men of science, namely the mechanistic theory known as naturalism. That the God of the historical Christian religion is not Dean Inge's God is clear from this passage, in which the presence of law in the mental as well as in the physical world is implied: "All that science has done to establish the uniformity and regularity of nature's operations tells heavily in favor of the existence of a single creative intelligence, and tells with equal force against the non-Christian hypothesis of a plurality of gods, against the Manichean theory of a good and an evil spirit contending on nearly equal terms in the arena, against the hypothesis of an inert and yet intractable 'matter,' and against any other theory which makes God a spirit among other spirits, struggling with only partial success to enter into His kingdom. It is against this dualism or pluralism that scientific men, and many others who cannot claim to be men of science, protest when they reject the vulgar conception of miracle as the suspension of a lower law by a higher" (368). A divine Being whose will is expressed exclusively in the laws discovered or discoverable by science is not the God of the Christian hymns and books of prayers. That such a conception of God is destructive of the existing forms of worship seems undeniable.

It is to be noted that several of our authors grant that "there is no mental phenomena, no experience which falls outside its province (psychology)"; and that "it would be at once foolish and useless to say to the psychologist, thus far and no farther, when he approaches the moral and religious consciousness" (Matthews, 21). Similar affirmations are made by Selbie and by Inge.

The treatment in these books of the problem of the nature and the relation of magic to religion makes critical comments easy. It is taken up most fully by Malinowski in his essay on "Magic, Science and Religion" (in *Science, Religion and Reality*) and by Selbie in "The Psychology of Religion." Both reject the dif-

ferentia proposed by Durkheim as inadequate, but there they stop, unable to find a satisfactory ground of distinction.

We are told by Selbie (31-35) that "the cultus of early religion" is now called magic. "Magic," he writes further, "is now, and for a long time has been, regarded with some moral reprobation. If it comes under the head of religion at all, it is religion of an illicit and degraded kind." From this one gathers that, according to this author, magic and religion cannot be separated.

Malinowski succeeds no better in characterizing magic as a form of behavior distinct from religion even though he claims to have made this "definite and tangible distinction": "We have defined, within the domain of the sacred, magic as a practical art consisting of acts which are only means to a definite end expected to follow later on; religion as a body of self-contained acts, being themselves the fulfilment of their purpose" (81). That religion also uses means to practical ends which may be expected to follow immediately or later on, must it seems, be admitted. Religion is, therefore, not thus to be separated from magic.

There is some mystery in these authors' refusal to use the one clear and sufficient differentia—a differentia indicated by several authors and in particular by the present writer in the second part of his "Psychological Study of Religion." The behavior of a person who thinks himself able to *coerce* some force, whether non-personal or personal, is psychologically quite different from the behavior of one who attempts to move to action by *social means* a personal agent, *i.e.*, by the offering of gifts, the rendering of services, supplications, and in general by the kind of means used in the social relations of man with man. That these two types of behavior are radically different with regard to will-attitude, feeling, and emotion, is obvious. Behavior could not differ more fundamentally than it does in these two different situations.

Now, we affirm that the primitive man practices these two types of behavior, and that the first corresponds to what is commonly called magic, and the second to what is ordinarily called religion. The organized religions of the civilized man fall under the second category of behavior and exclude the first. Why not then use this definite differentia and say that, before the distinction was made in early society between a behavior intended to coerce a personal or impersonal power and a behavior seeking by social means to influence a personal power there was no religion but only pre-religious forms of behavior, out of which by a process of differentiation arose the religious be-

havior? When we do so, the behavior of man towards *Mana*, "an impersonal all-pervading power" (Selbie, 35), will not be called "the earliest stage of religion," as Selbie does (35), but magic. This differentiation of religion from magic will not be acceptable to those who, having rejected the central idea of the religions, retain the use of the term to designate merely an attitude of devotion to the welfare of humanity or a spiritualistic philosophy, or even a sense of communion with an unseen Power manifesting himself in the natural laws of physics and of psychology.

The conception of the sacred has come to play in the minds of many an important rôle in the understanding of the nature of religion. Following the theologian Otto and the sociologist Durkheim, Principal Oman in a thoughtful paper on "the Sphere of Religion" finds the sacred coextensive with religion: "Everything that is sacred is in the sphere of religion, and everything in the sphere of religion is sacred . . . therefore, if there is any one mark of the sphere of religion it is the valuation of everything within it as sacred" (295-296). There is not space here for an adequate criticism of this point of view. Let it be remarked merely that magic as well as religion refers to the sacred, and that to conceive of religion as consisting, in essence, in a feeling is too incomplete a conception to be adequately descriptive of the religions. This last criticism applies also to religion when it is defined as a valuational attitude.

The Psychology of Religion is the first of the series of Oxford Handbooks of Theology, prepared under the direction of the Bishop of Gloucester, "for the use of theological students and others who are anxious for wise and sober instruction on questions of religion and theology."

Principal Selbie's volume is certainly sober; and it will be called wise not so much because of its learning and thoughtfulness as because it seeks the preservation of the existing religious order.

The author's concern for a recognition of the "severe limitations of psychology" appears already in the preface, and the topic is taken up at some length in a chapter on the "Psychological Approach to Religion." There the familiar statement is made that the task of psychology is that of observation and description: "It is not concerned to explain mental processes and their working except in so far as explanation is involved in description"; "It does not aim at any metaphysical or transcendental explanation, though it may provide materials for them" (14). The prepossession of the author appears

in this sentence, "The psychologist may indeed argue, with some show of justification, that his study of the religious consciousness gives him good ground for assuming the reality of the spiritual world with which it purports to bring men into contact." As a matter of fact, the more important results of the labors of the professional psychologists is that no warrant has been found in the religious experiences for a belief in the God of the religions. If that belief is to remain, it must be on some other ground than as an inference from facts of immediate experience.

The same point of view is maintained in *Psychology and the Church*, by W. R. Matthews, in the opening paper, "The Psychological Standpoint and Its Limitations" (21-25), and by H. M. Relton, in "The Psychology of Prayer and Religious Experience." The latter writes: "The utmost that a psychological study of prayer and religious experience may be expected to yield is a description of the phenomena. A description, however, is not an explanation. Psychology is not concerned with objections to prayer, but with the fact and analysis of its content" (71). We add that it may occupy itself also with the origin of the belief, and find it tenable or untenable.

One cannot refrain from wondering why so much effort to keep psychology within its own field. Is it that it really threatens something which these writers want to preserve? As a matter of fact psychology is threatening belief in a conception at the very center of all the religions—not the *existence* of a spiritual world, but the *belief* in the particular kind of spiritual world implied in the worship of all the religions, *i.e.*, the belief in a personal God in direct affective and intellectual communication with man.

The crux of the matter is that (1) the *belief* of the masses in the God of the religions is not the fruit of metaphysical considerations but is an inference from particular facts of "outer" or "inner" experience; and (2) that the psychologist finds that law reigns in the mental as well as in the physical world. Thus the traditional understanding of the cause of the effects of prayer is set aside. The problem of the ultimate nature of the universe is not thereby answered,—that problem is, indeed beyond the realm of psychology or of any particular science.

Much that is written on the limitations of psychology would not have been written had the authors distinguished between the problem of the actual cause of the belief in the God of religions and the problem of a metaphysical interpretation of experience in general. The first problem is psychological, the second is not.

Selbie's book covers a wide range of topics: "The Religious Consciousness; Religion and the Individual; Religion and Society; Religion and the Psychology of Adolescence; The Psychology of Conversion; Prayer; Sin and Repentance; Mysticism (a chapter to which reference will be made in our Review on Mysticism); The Hope of Immortality. The treatment of several of these topics includes brief historical surveys. On the whole, and with the limitations indicated here, the book will render the services intended by the author.

Psychology and the Church, like *Science, Religion and Reality*, is a product of coöperation between several persons. It aims at "removing some of the difficulties and making available, especially for the clergy, some of the lessons, of a new way of thought which it will be very dangerous to neglect." Three of its six contributors are Chaplains in the Church of England, a fourth is professor of Dogmatic Theology at King's College and the two others, joint authors of the essay on "The Psychology of Spiritual Healing," are respectively Lecturer in Psychology at King's College and Physician to a Clinic for Functional Nerve Cases. The subjects discussed are, in addition to Spiritual Healing, the Psychological Standpoint and its Limitations, the Progress and Present Position of the Study of Psychology (an historical sketch in which modern psychology is represented almost exclusively by McDougall and the Freudians), the Psychology of Prayer and Religious Experience, and the Psychology of Moral Development (limited almost exclusively in its references to Shand, McDougall, and the new psychology).

Little need be added to what has been said above regarding the attitude of these authors toward psychology and their efforts to circumscribe the field of that science so that it will leave untouched that which they want to preserve in the traditional religious beliefs. Relton in "The Psychology of Prayer," is particularly insistent on the limitations of psychology. Agreement with him on the position that "Experience must always transcend a description of it and contains more than words can express" (81) does not in any way invalidate the conclusion of psychology that the present belief in the God of the churches, insofar as it is an inference from particular experiences, is falsely derived. And when the problem considered is the laws to which the effects of prayer are subject, it is entirely irrelevant to remark that "no psychological analysis of a sensation can reproduce its 'felftness,' no objective representation of religion

can do full justice to the actual experience." As well remind the chemist that, when he analyzes food material, he does not feed himself or anybody else and that, therefore, his conclusions regarding the laws of nutrition do not do full justice to the experience of digestion. No, they do not; but his laws hold nevertheless.

It seems to Relton that the new moral energy, the heightened conviction and enlarged spiritual vision, which frequently came in prayer, point to the intervention of a divine Being. But these facts of prayer and of mystical communion can be explained psychologically—"explained" in the same sense as the enjoyment, the comfort, and at times the changed moral outlook produced by a good dinner can be explained—has been set forth in the author's "*Psychology of Religious Mysticism*" (see in particular Chapter X).

The authors of this book, as also Selbie, agree in holding that however doubtful we may be as to the question of truth, we cannot fail to recognize the practical effectiveness of the religious method. They endorse Wm. James' utterance: "However our opinion of prayer effects may come to be limited by criticism, religion in the vital sense must stand or fall by the persuasion that effects of some sort genuinely do occur." And, with apparently the exception of the scientific contributors, they understand this effectiveness to be represented not merely by the so-called psychological effects of prayer, but by a direct action of God (Selbie, 16-17).

The psychologist also is prepared to accept the pragmatic test. He may, however, come to the conclusion that the scientific method of moral education far transcends the religious method in effectiveness—the method of the religious being one of appeal to and of reliance upon God.

The conviction expressed by the clerical writers of "*Psychology and the Church*" that the experience of prayer goes beyond what psychological science can achieve, receives no support from the scientific contributors, Hadfield and Browne. In their valuable paper on spiritual healing, these authors find themselves in agreement with the Commission recently appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury to study spiritual healing in the Church of England. They write: "For us it is only pertinent to say that there is no sufficient evidence that prayer does actually produce cures which cannot be effected by psychotherapy" (195). They are of opinion that until we know more than we do of the nature of the forces of nature "we cannot tell if spiritual healing is different from psychotherapy" (198). Their definition of spiritual healing is, however,

open to criticism. It runs thus: "The treatment or healing of diseased conditions, whether of body, mind, or spirit, bringing the personality into relation with God" (171). That is not a definition acceptable to science; it goes beyond what these authors themselves have admitted elsewhere: Science does not know that in prayer there is contact with a divine person. That is the traditional understanding of the matter, but science knows only that in prayer we *think* and *feel* ourselves in the presence or in communion with God.

Their remarks upon the superior potency of contact with, or belief in, great and noble personalities, particularly if a love-relationship is established with them, are important. But, again, there is nothing here, in the field of science, which points beyond the mobilization by psychological means of energies belonging to man himself.

RECENT FRENCH BOOKS ON RELIGIOUS MYSTICISM

BY JAMES H. LEUBA

Bryn Mawr College

- MAXIME DE MONTMORAND. *Psychologie des Mystiques catholiques orthodoxes*. Paris: Alcan, 1920. Pp. 262.
- JOSEPH MARÉCHAL. *Etudes sur la Psychologie des Mystiques, Tome I*. Bruges: Beyaert, 1924. Pp. 266.
- JEAN BARUZI. *Saint Jean de la Croix et le problème de l'expérience mystique*. Paris: Alcan, 1924. Pp. vii + 790.
- GASTON ETCHEGOYEN. *L'Amour divin; Essai sur les sources de Ste Thérèse*. Bordeaux: Féret et fils, 1923. Pp. 377.
- A. HOUTIN. *Une Grande Mystique Madame Bruyère, Abbessé de Solesmes (1845-1909)*. Paris: Alcan, 1925. Pp. vii + 316.

The French continue to show a lively interest in religious mysticism, while little worthy of notice has been published elsewhere in Europe during the last three or four years. Most of the French publications are, however, historical rather than psychological studies. The last three of the volumes listed above are of that description; they constitute important contributions to our detailed knowledge of the life, the mystical experiences, and the theories of three great mystics.

The volumes of Montmorand and Maréchal cannot be said to have added anything significant either to our historical knowledge of any one mystic or to our understanding of any point of mystical experience. They are both Roman Catholics and the latter is Professor at the *Collège Philosophique et Théologique de la Compagnie de Jesus* at Louvain. His book bears the *imprimatur* of his church. These two volumes are mainly interesting for the information they provide on the efforts of Roman Catholics to discredit the results of the scientific study of mysticism.

Baruzi's study of St. John of the Cross, a younger contemporary of St. Theresa and for a space her confessor and associate in the establishment of a Reformed order of Carmelites, is the most thorough and important historical contribution to our knowledge of the great classical mystics which has appeared for many years.

Baruzi is known to the historians of philosophy by his publications on Leibnitz.

The book falls into four parts, the Sources, the Life, the Relation of the Experience to the Doctrine, and the Doctrine. A "Bibliographical Study" of 36 crowded pages is added. It is altogether an exhaustive piece of work, based in part on unpublished sources. On several points it throws new light not only upon the life of the Saint but also upon the religious history of the XVIth century in Spain. It is henceforth to this book that the psychological student of this most influential mystic will have to go for his documentation.

The experience of St. John of the Cross does not seem to have differed in any essential particular from that of, for instance, St. Theresa. The most characteristic part of his teaching is his low estimate of the significance and value of visions, auditions, and of the delights of ecstasy. God, he holds, is beyond anything we can feel, imagine, conceive, and desire. Union with God takes place only in the entirely naked soul, *i.e.*, in the soul divested of all image, thought, feeling, and desire. That state is called by him the *Night of the Mind*. It is at that point in the Ascent of the Soul to God that the divine Light appears. Needless to add that on this Light, shining only when nothing remains of the diverse modes of ordinary consciousness, no light is thrown. The Saint's descriptions stop, as might be expected, at that point. It was relatively easy to describe the Ascent to God in so long as it consisted in a gradual limitation and ultimate cessation of all the mental activities. The description of what is alleged to take place in the Night of the Mind when God makes Himself known to man, was another and an impossible task.

Baruzi's efforts to help the reader to understand the Saint and to extract the meaning which is supposed to be hidden in his obscure phrases, cannot be said to be successful. What is this mystical, divine intuition, requiring for its appearance the complete cessation of the natural activities of the mind? Baruzi's long and painstaking efforts bring out nothing which would demand a reconsideration of the psychological explanation I have offered in the chapters on Illumination and Revelation and on the Sense of divine Presence in my "Psychology of Religious Mysticism."

I shall venture the opinion that Baruzi, together with many a philosopher, takes too seriously what is really nothing more than metaphysical *naïvetés*. We shall not understand the mystics until we take them at a lower valuation. They are on the whole amazingly bare minded, and are, above all, guided in their thinking by antique

preconceptions. The frequent amateurishness and haphazardness of their explanations is obvious to those who read them with an open mind. I might point to several instances of crudity of thought in St. Theresa's Autobiography. Even Etchegoyen, who is not unusually clear sighted, noticed that her ability for systematic, abstract, thinking is not of the best. I cannot help believing that Baruzi's efforts, in the interpretative part of his great book, is largely misdirected. He reminds me of a spectator at a materialization seance who tortures his mind to understand something which did not really happen.

L'Amour divin of Etchegoyen is a Doctor's dissertation published by the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes Hispaniques*. At the time of his untimely death (1922) the author was Professor of literature and philosophy at the French Lycée of Madrid. The dissertation traces the immediate literary sources of St. Theresa's teaching, style and images. He discusses, for instance, the sources of her notions about divine love, and of her metaphorical use of such terms as water, fire, light, love-wound, etc.

The author concludes that she owes her literary and mystical expressions first to Francisco de Ossuna and to Bernardino de Laredo, and secondly to Rudolphe de Saxe and Luis de Granada. For 30 years she fingered the "Third A. B. C." of Ossuna. When the author affirms that most of her "Ideas and images are more or less unconscious reminiscences," he does not mean to deny her a fair degree of originality, nor does he intend to gainsay her own statement in the Autobiography: "I shall say nothing of that which I have not experienced myself or seen in others."

In order to pass judgment upon the solidity of Etchegoyen's findings, one would have to refer to his source material—a thing which I cannot do. His criticism of the interpretation which I have placed upon the word "bowels" (*entrailles*) in my Essay in the *Revue Philosophique*, under the title "*Les Tendances Fondamentales des Mystiques Chrétiens*," and again in the fifth chapter of my "Psychological Study of Mysticism" (p. 144), might lead one to doubt the reliability of his judgments. The passage referred to is this: On several occasions St. Theresa had the vision of an angel who "held in his hands a long golden dart, tipped with fire." "From time to time he would plunge it through my heart and push it down into my bowels (*entrailles*)."

I have interpreted "bowels," in the light thrown by the rest of the

passage and by a great mass of information referred to in the chapter mentioned, as indicating most probably the participation of sex organs in the inexpressibly delightful pains to which she refers. Etchegoyen rejects this interpretation. According to him "*entrailles*" has in this place no reference to anything so objectionable as sex organs: that word, in her terminology and in the Castillian tongue, is "usually much less precise." And he quotes Cervantes and Lope de Vega who use the term synonymously with heart. That, he affirms, is the meaning given to it by the Spanish Franciscans. His further remark that a heart pierced with an arrow was already then a well worn image and that contemporaries of St. Theresa speak of "loving God with *des entrailles inflammées*," is neither here nor there. For the question is not whether the term was used synonymously with heart, but whether it was used only so; and, more particularly, whether it was used in that sense in the passage under consideration. That the Saint does not in this passage use bowels synonymously with heart is incontrovertibly established, it seems to me, by her very words: "He would plunge it through my heart and push it down into my bowels." The two words, heart and bowels, cannot here have the same meaning.

The opinion that in all likelihood the sex organs participated in those experiences of St. Theresa is, however, derived in part from other and non-mystical experiences of inexpressible delight, some of which are reported in the chapter mentioned above,—experiences apparently unknown to Etchegoyen.

The larger part of the book of Albert Houtin consists of a *Mémoire* sent in 1892 by a monk of Solesmes, don Joseph Sauton, to the Holy Inquisition, unpublished until now. It is in substance an accusation of the Abbess of Solesmes, Mme. Bruyère, who was favored by remarkable mystical experiences. Don Sauton, after being for two years under her religious direction, saw in her character reasons for breaking with her.

The editor of this *Mémoire* has added an instructive life of the Abbess (pp. 1-80). The value of this volume to the psychologist is, as in the case of the two preceding ones, that of a document on the religious life of a great mystic and, in addition, on the religious life of the Solesmes monastery.

Cecile Bruyère is known as the author of a mystical treatise, "*La vie spirituelle et l'oraison*."

Montmorand limits his study to the orthodox Roman Catholic mystics because, according to him, orthodox mysticism constitutes "an original mysticism distinct from all others." The orthodox mystics are, of course, those who conform to the teachings of the Roman Church. In addition, we are told that they do not desire "spiritual favors," "they fear them; one might say that they detest them" (80-81). If this last criterion was to be strictly applied, most of the mystics sanctified by the Church would cease to be regarded as orthodox. Neither for instance Catherine of Sienna nor St. Theresa fulfills this demand. Any statement in their works supporting Montmorand's contention can be matched by others opposed to it. The most one might claim is that *their theory* of mysticism attaches little value to visions, the delights of ecstasy, and other "favors." But one cannot truly affirm that in practice they did not desire and highly value them.

In my estimation, the book fails completely to substantiate the claim of an essential distinction between orthodox and non-orthodox mysticism. Montmorand's efforts in this respect is a strategic retreat made in an effort to save traditional dogma. For he appears to have read the recent scientific studies on mysticism more carefully and more nearly with an open mind than other Roman Catholic writers and to have felt to some extent their forcefulness.

The book takes up the several topics usually discussed in a treatise on mysticism: the ascetic method; visions and auditions; ecstasy and its several degrees; secular and religious love. His facts are drawn mainly from St. Theresa. In the descriptive parts the author shows mastery of his subject, but whenever he attempts psychological discussions and explanations his lack of fundamental psychological knowledge is apparent.

Objections are called forth by (1) his unacceptable use of the expression "religious instinct"; (2) his attempt to limit the validity of the James-Lange theory of emotion (46-47); (3) his explanation of "supernatural" visions and auditions (116ff); (4) his treatment of eroticism in the mystics (51-53); and (5) his classification of ecstasies (170ff).

I shall offer brief critical remarks on the last three points. Supernatural visions and auditions assuredly come, he agrees, from a subconscious, but it is neither the subconscious of Janet nor that of Myers and James. They come from or, rather, through a normal subconscious, namely, the subconscious involved in artistic, literary, and scientific inspiration. The subconscious of Janet and of Myers

are, according to him, abnormal. They are therefore rejected in favor of a normal subconscious. The revelation in ecstatic mysticism are, nevertheless, held to be supernatural.

In his treatment of eroticism he begins by admitting that "the body in a St. Theresa or in a Marguerite Marie participates in the enjoyment of the soul" (61), but he concludes that the eroticism of the orthodox mystics is merely verbal (69). They have fallen into the habit of using the sensual terms of the *Canticle of Canticles* because they are accustomed to take that poem as an expression of pure spiritual love. Here, as in most of his other discussions, he is quite superficial. He leaves out of consideration several aspects of the matter as well as several classes of facts which, in my opinion, lead unavoidably to the belief that the secular love terms of the *Canticle of Canticles* are used because they fit admirably a condition in which the sex organs are aroused. Mlle. Vê's discovery of the reason why the erotic love terms of that poem fitted her experience has apparently remained unknown to Montmorand (see "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism," 146-149).

His classification of ecstasies illustrate best perhaps the superficiality of his analyses and the compelling influence of his purpose to separate from other ecstasies an alleged true, divine, mystical ecstasy. He opposes it to a physiological, an hypnotic or Buddhistic, a cataleptic, and an hysterical ecstasy. I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere that all ecstasies fall into the category of trance; that, as such, they have in common fundamental characteristics; and that the conscious content of any particular trance determines its secondary characteristics and differentiates it from other varieties. A trance regarded by the subject as due to the direct action of a loving God is, by that belief, transformed into a Christian love-trance or ecstasy.

Montmorand shares the widely held opinion that the moral fruits of the mystical trance establish its specific, divine nature (175, *Comp.* pp. 259-263 of "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism"). He is quite sure in any case, that it is not for psychology to argue whether or not there is divine intervention in mysticism; on that point the Church of Rome is the source of knowledge.

Maréchal's *Studies* is a reprint in book form of several articles published before 1914. The Preface announces a second volume which will consist mainly of a comparative study of mysticism and of essays on mysticism in the Hindu religion and in Islam.

The present volume is made up of chapters on "Empirical

science and Religious Psychology," in which the limitations of science are set forth in the usual manner; on "The Sense of Presence in the Non-Believers and in the Mystics"; and on "Certain Traits Distinctive of Christian Mysticism." The general purpose of the book is the same as that of Montmorand's studies, and its argumentation is not more convincing. Ironical points of exclamation occasionally take the place of a refutation.

NOTE ON MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES FOR THE
DISCUSSION OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

BY JAMES H. LEUBA

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The place made for the psychology of religion at recent scientific and philosophical meetings may serve to indicate the importance attached to that branch of psychology.

At the International Congress of Psychology held at Gröningen, September, 1926, a session devoted to the psychology of religion was addressed by Pierre Janet, Ernest Jones, James H. Leuba, and Robert H. Thouless. The last three spoke on "The Nature, the Field, and the Methods of the Psychology of Religion"; the subject of the first was "Social Excitation in the Religious Sentiment."

The International Congress of Philosophy, held almost simultaneously at Harvard University, had a session on "Mysticism in the East and West." Prof. Edwin D. Starbuck; Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, Professor of Philosophy at Calcutta; Dr. Halmuth von Glasenapp, Professor of Indic Philosophy at Berlin; Dr. Edward S. Ames; and Dr. Charles A. Bennett read papers. The paper of Professor Starbuck, entitled "The Empirical Study of Mysticism," may be of special interest to the readers of this journal.

The Hartford School of Religious Education of the Hartford Seminary Foundation held on the 16th of October, 1926, a conference on "The Possible Contributions of Modern Psychology to the Theory and the Practice of Religion." Papers were read by Dr. Thaddeus H. Ames, psychoanalyst, of New York; Professor James H. Leuba, of Bryn Mawr; President George B. Cutten, of Colgate University; Professor James B. Pratt, of Williams College; and Dr. Frankwood E. Williams, Medical Director for Mental Hygiene.

A sufficient amount of time for discussion was provided at the Hartford Conference, with gratifying results. At the Congresses the time given to the discussions was too limited to make them worth while.

SPECIAL REVIEWS

PIERRE BOVET. *Le Sentiment religieux et la psychologie de l'enfant*. Neuchâtel: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1924(?). Pp. 172.

This small book by the Director of the *Institut J. J. Rousseau* at Geneva is a highly interesting exposition of the starting point and of the development in children of what the author calls the "religious sentiment." That sentiment, born in the human soul in the relations of the child with its parents, and later on transferred to God, is filial love. The book is enriched and enlivened by a large number of documents expressing the feelings and ideas of children concerning their parents, natural objects, and God.

There are instructive chapters on the First Adoration (that of the parents regarded as omnipotent and omniscient), the First Religious Crisis (due to the discovery of the limitations and defects of the parents—a discovery which prepares the transference of love to God), on God in the World (setting forth in many striking illustrations the natural animistic tendency of the child), and on problems of religious education. An appendix on Respect and Spiritual Unity completes the volume.

Insofar as he finds the first manifestations and early development of love in the family circle and regards the love of God as a transference of filial affection from the parents to God, Bovet will meet with general approval.

One may, however, question the propriety of speaking of filial love as *the* religious sentiment. Assuredly several other sentiments appear in diverse religions. The sentiment singled out in this book is rather the one which becomes the dominant, if not the only one, in the higher ethical religions.

One may also regret the use of the expression "religious sentiment" when it is made to stand for the sum total of the religious life. That term designates, I hold, only an affective aspect of the religious life and should not be used, as it seems to be here and by many other French writers, as a synonym for religious life.

JAMES H. LEUBA

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MAURICE NEESER. *Du Protestantisme au Catholicisme; du Catholicisme au Protestantisme*. Neuchâtel: Attinger, 1926. Pp. 238.

The author is a doctor in theology, professor at the University of Neuchâtel. His book is one of the too rare indications that theologians are coming to realize the importance of providing a detailed basis of facts for their generalizations.

After an introduction we are given, in three successive parts, penetrating analyses of a large number of classified conversions. In a fourth and last part are brought together the results of the preceding analyses. The converts who pass from Protestantism to Catholicism do so, it appears, mainly because of unusually compelling needs for esthetic satisfaction, for unity, for authoritative direction, and for security and peace, as provided by the Roman Church. Those who pass from Catholicism to Protestantism do so for opposite reasons.

In the twelfth chapter is discussed the relation between temperament and the different dominant tendencies which characterize these two groups of persons. The author attempts to bring back these differences to the differences usually said to exist between the four classical temperaments first named by Hippocrates. In this part of his work Neeser does not seem to have made full use of the more recent psychological knowledge.

JAMES H. LEUBA

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HARRY ELMER BARNES. *Psychology and History*. N. Y.: The Century Company, 1925. Pp. 195.

This book is a reprint as a separate work of a chapter of "The New History and the Social Studies" published a few years ago. It is intended as a "summary of the major developments in social psychology and psychiatry which are of significance for the historian." Its chief importance for the psychologist "will consist in a review of the efforts which have been made by the historians and others to apply psychological methods and data to the interpretation of the history of man and human culture."

To state summarily the respective contributions to the social sciences of a galaxy of historians, sociologists, psychologists, and ethnologists, spreading through two generations; to indicate their relations to each other, the points of likeness and difference of their theories, is a task calling for vast learning and mature judgment.

The author has on the whole accomplished his task satisfactorily, and the psychologists, with many others, will be grateful to him for having undertaken it. The book might profitably be used with advanced classes as a guide in the study of the development of those aspects of psychological science which concern mainly the social sciences. The bibliographical reference are abundant and accompanied by useful comments.

The particular psychological doctrines considered are those connected with the names of Wm. James, Stanley Hall, and James M. Baldwin (the genetic movement); of Thorndike, McDougall, and Trotter (in connection mainly with the problem of innate capacities, instincts). This is followed by a review of the attack on instinct. At this point the author passes from the psychologists to the sociologists and historians who have attempted to work out the principles of a psychological interpretation of history. Bagehot comes first, then LeBon, Tarde, Wundt. The ethnologists who have laid stress on culture rather than on principles of individual or social psychology or on the *milieu* to explain the development of society, are grouped together, beginning with Brinton, Boas, and his disciples, Wissler, Lowie, Goldenweiser. Under the heading "The Psychological Interpretation of History," Karl Lamprecht and James Harvey Robinson are summarized. The last section of the work is on "Modern Dynamic Psychology and the Interpretation of History." It is essentially a brief general treatment of the psychology of the unconscious. The author perceives very clearly the transformation in the explanation of history which this new point of view brings with it. Aware though he is of the extravagances to which the pure Freudians have gone, we will venture the opinion that he will come to perceive even more fully the unscientific character of much of what remains when the sheer extravagances of the psychoanalytical system have been eliminated.

In a few final pages is attempted an application of this dynamic psychology to the explanation of the main traits of Hamilton and Jefferson as they manifest themselves in their political action. Jefferson's father was "a gruff giant with a tremendous temper." From the early experience of Thomas with him, came, according to the author, the Jeffersonian democracy: "In a very real sense the Jeffersonian democracy can be regarded as an elaborate disguise and secondary rationalization of his innate revolt against authority. And it is as accurate to say that American democracy may be traced back to the recoil of the pallid youth of Shadwell from his gigantic and

formidable father as to hold that it derives its origin from the Teutonic folk-moot or opposition to the political and economic program of Hamilton" (172). The uncertainty of the Freudian findings in a case like this—recognized in part by the author—appears vividly when one recalls that even though for generations children were ruled by the rod held in the rough hands of fathers and dominies, few of them developed rabid individuality complexes. And of those who to-day have, in Jeffersonian language, "sworn on the altar of God eternal hostility to every form of tyranny over the mind of man" not many have gruff giants as fathers. The present-day movement in education, aiming at self-expression and freedom, has roots that cannot be correctly and fully expressed in the Freudian vocabulary.

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E. LEHIGH MUDGE. *The God Experience*. Cincinnati: The Caxton Press, 1923. Pp. 88.

"The God-experience owes its vitality to the fact that it is deep-rooted in the most vital and significant elements of sense and feeling. It is more than cognition or intellectual comprehension." That thesis—from which no psychologist, I think, will dissent—is established in successive brief chapters on the part played in the experience of God by the external and by the internal senses (chiefly those located in the viscera). These latter components of the God-experience are the main basis for appreciation or valuation; they are held to produce, with their affective accompaniments, the emotional quality of the experience.

The author is well informed in the field of psycho-physiology within which his study moves, and the book has its merits. One is surprised, however, at the absence of a definite recognition of the fact that in the relations of men with men every one of the numerous items mentioned by the author in his description of the God-experience may be present.

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CARVETH READ. *Man and His Superstitions*. Second Edition. Cambridge: University Press, 1925. Pp. 278.

The purpose of this volume is to discuss the characteristics of superstitious beliefs. It is described in the preface as a corrected

impression of the last seven chapters of *The Origin of Man and of His Superstitions*, published in 1920. The first two chapters of that work have been enlarged, rearranged, and issued separately in a new edition, as *The Origin of Man*. The present volume opens with a discussion of the psychology of belief and superstition. Subsequent chapters are devoted to Magic, Animism, The Relations between Magic and Animism, Omens, The Mind of the Wizard, Totemism, and Magic and Science.

The method employed is the statement of generalizations, with illustrations. This method is always open to the danger that the author may unconsciously select only those instances conforming to his prejudices, ignoring contradictory cases. No evidence is offered that any attempt has been made in preparing this work to examine thoroughly an impartial sampling of cases, or to search for negative instances in connection with the generalizations advanced.

Statements which strike the reviewer as questionable are scattered through the book. The following are examples:

"We may reasonably assume that the simplest magical beliefs and practices are of the earliest type" (p. 42). Such an assumption would be unsound in connection with the grammars of ancient languages; is it valid here?

"We may perhaps discern the moment when Magic first fastened upon the human mind. . . . Unforeseen occurrences might frustrate his plans. Hence an irresistible desire to strengthen and insure every stage of this task; and to gratify this desire Magic arose" (p. 46). The passion to discover the "moment" when various things began is one which the study of social origins is rapidly outgrowing. Basic culture elements do not begin suddenly; they develop in primitive societies with imperceptible gradualness. When did intelligence begin? When did the universe begin? Such questions are hardly profitable.

"I conceive that after the organization of the primitive hunting pack had, by various causes, been weakened or destroyed, it was through belief in Magic that some sort of leadership and subordination was reestablished" (p. 183). This quotation has the flavor of the discarded theories according to which all primitive life evolved through a set series of culture states. Even assuming such stages, on what evidence would Professor Read base his assumption that between the hunting and the pastoral or agricultural stages there was any weakening or destruction of social organization?

"A tribe that produces poets has an advantage in the struggle of

life; and accordingly, a strain of poet-blood is bred in the tribe, and shows itself in a certain number of youths in each generation. . . . (This same principle) accounts for the flourishing from age to age of the wizardly profession, and for the attraction it has for those of wizardly blood who enter it, because it promises to satisfy an innate disposition" (pp. 197-98). In one who regards argument by analogy as characteristic of superstition, this hasty borrowing, in questionable form, and without objective verification, of the biological principles of survival of the fit and of innate instinct, is peculiar.

The author emphasizes repeatedly the fact that the rise of superstitious beliefs is favored by the emotional attitude which pervades magic and animism. It is notable, therefore, that at several points (*e.g.*, pp. 116, 153 and 172) he gives indications of strong emotionalism in his own attitude, that he repeatedly has recourse to sarcasm (pp. 61, 142, 155, and 272) and that he makes confessions like the following:

"At present, a day rarely passes without my experiencing some impulse to practice Magic" (p. 45).

"For myself, I am free to confess . . . that Omens and presentiments still haunt the shadowy precincts of imagination with vague shapes and mutterings of evils to come" (p. 181).

Allied to the apparent emotional basis of Professor Read's attitude toward the problem is his dogmatic attitude toward animism. He assumes without argument that belief in spiritual beings of any sort must be superstitious:

"Nor is it easy to see how belief in the efficacy of prayer (beginning in this way) could ever have been established, unless it were confirmed by coincidence—just like Magic" (p. 130. See also pp. 87, 125, 151, and 175).

This attitude is peculiar in that the author apparently takes seriously the inquiries of psychical researchers into the problem of telekinesis. (See p. 54.)

His categorical denial of the existence of spiritual beings is pure dogma, since a considerable number of men of high attainment in science have asserted, after years of serious study, that the spiritistic interpretation of psychical phenomena is an hypothesis worthy of consideration. Scientists are prone to confuse lack of proof with disproof. To deny without adequate disproof is as unsound as to believe without adequate proof.

Professor Read's discussion brings out, however, many stimulating ideas. For example, he suggests, on page 72, that in addition

to sympathetic magic, "exemplary" magic should be recognized as a second indirect type. His discussion of the mechanization of magic through repetition is suggestive:

"Magical rites and spells, on whatever scale performed, are things to be repeated, and what is repeated is mechanized and ceases to live. Custom can maintain a practice whilst dispensing with its meaning; slowly the practice (spell or ritual) is slurred and corrupted. Economy, 'least effort,' is the enemy of all ceremonial" (p. 74).

Instances are given in which this process has reduced prayers into spells (p. 135). The author quotes Mr. Warde Fowler on Roman public prayers as follows:

"The idea that the spoken formula (derived from an age of Magic) was efficient only if no slip were made, seems to have gained in strength instead of diminishing, as we might have expected it to do with advancing civilization" (p. 135). He suggests that this notion of minor errors as destroying the effectiveness of a prayer or spell furnished excuses for failure to both priests and wizards. This observation reminds one rather forcibly of the magical attitude taken toward indictments by the laws and judges of certain states, where the omission or the misspelling of a name often invalidates an entire trial.

The author's intimation that as much painstaking and ingenuity have perhaps been expended upon the art of divination as upon industry and science put together (p. 170) is worthy to be pondered. He makes the interesting suggestion that

"It may be some excuse for Omens that the interpretation of them was a sort of gymnastic for ingenuity, and was a means by which the quick-witted maintained themselves in a world of violence" (p. 177).

HORNELL HART

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD. *The Psychology of Human Society: an Introduction to Sociological Theory*. N. Y.: Appleton, 1925. Pp. xvi+495.

This book by Professor Ellwood is no more than his earlier ones a treatise mainly in the science of psychology. "The problems with which the book deals," so writes the author, "are those of sociology, rather than psychology in the strict sense. The problem of psychology is to explain the experience and the behavior of the individual, . . . the study of group life is sociology. . . . That

part of the study which concerns itself with group behavior . . . may be called . . . 'social psychology,' or 'psychology of society,' . . . or at least . . . 'psychological sociology,' and this is what we shall concern ourselves with." The book "takes up the problem of group behavior where Allport's *Social Psychology* . . . leaves it off." And yet it is "not a development of the psychological principles employed by Allport. James Dewey, Thorndike, and Woodworth furnish the leading principles used."

A very large number of large sociological problems are faced within the pages of the book. Rather than attempt to summarize the answers given to these it may serve better in this review to give in condensed quotations the author's principal psychological positions.

"The two marks of 'social life' are (1) co-operation, in the sense of the carrying on of certain common activities by a group, and (2) mental interaction, in the sense of conscious interstimulation and response." "Conscious relations there may be without social life, but there is no social life without conscious relations or mental interaction. It is, therefore, the psychic element which constitutes the 'social.'"

"The original differences between the sexes seem to lie not so much in intellectual capacity as in temperament or emotional reaction. They consist of slight differences in strength, particularly of certain emotional reactions. They seem to favor the harmonious adaptation of the sexes to each other in normal social life, and hence we may call them complementary differences. They are differences which have been developed in our organic division of labor between the sexes."

"The original differences between the various human races are equally significant," but these again are "more temperamental and emotional than intellectual," and are "quantitative differences, not qualitative." "The maladjustments between races are more probably the results of culture than of irreconcilable hereditary differences."

In opposition to the "Passive View of Human Nature" in which it is common "to speak of the external stimulus as though it were the cause of action or behavior," it is held that "the cause of a given act lies, rather, in the whole set of the nervous system of an individual and in all the environing conditions. . . . The individual must be conceived of as a self-active and relatively independent unit, more or less capable of determining his own behavior among the conditions and forces surrounding him."

As opposed to the "Hedonistic View, according to which the

individual is moved to action wholly by pleasure or pain," it is held that "activity may be antecedent to feeling. Feeling accompanies rather than precedes activity, nevertheless, feeling may modify activity. Pleasant feeling seems to reinforce activity, while unpleasant feeling may inhibit activity."

Over against the "Egoistic View of Human Nature," it is proposed that, "we find in original human nature both altruistic, or other-regarding, impulses, and egoistic, or self-regarding. Which impulses will be stronger in the adult individual is, however, a matter of education and environment."

As contrasted with the "Individualistic View," the position is taken that "While science shows the individual to be a self-active, more or less self-determining unit, it shows him at the same time to have been fashioned by an organic evolution which has been conditioned by social evolution. Mental capacities have been developed in connection with group life, and their main function has been to adapt the individual to his group."

On the relation to group life of the different levels of human behavior it is held that, "In the human individual . . . we find few or no hereditary reactions of the fixed and definite type which we find in the lower types of life, such as among the insects. On the other hand, we seem to find a great variety of 'native impulses,' 'natural' or 'instinctive tendencies,' all more or less modifiable. In this broad sense it is probably true that man has more instincts than any other animal. What are ordinarily called 'instincts' in individual behavior, however, are complexes or combinations of these instinctive impulses with acquired reactions. Man's capacity to acquire an indefinite number of habits is the main basis upon which cultural evolution has been built."

"Feeling modifies activity or behavior. If feeling is pleasurable, the activity is reinforced, but if feeling is disagreeable, the activity tends to be inhibited. The feelings which are connected with organic reactions are particularly strong, and we call them the emotions. The emotions are particularly strong modifiers of behavior. Feeling furnishes the most persistent, conscious motives to action in the mass of individuals. It is feelings, or sentiments and desires, of the mass of individuals that immediately motivate mass action. Feeling has often a powerful conservative effect in our social life because it tends to reinforce habitual activities. Feeling also often proves a dissolving force in human society as regards the higher types of behavior; for

the most powerful feelings are attached to our instinctive or animal impulses."

"The function of intelligence is to evaluate and control activities with reference to present and future environments. Man's innate capacity for intelligence beyond that of any other animal is especially what has given him a distinctive social life. Intelligence gives conscious purposes to group life. The intelligent control over the formation of habit (or over the selection of impulses) is the basis of the learning process. Groups of individuals learn to do new things and to build up complex adjustments through intelligent control of the formation of habits. It is in this way that man has built up a social life unlike that of any other animal."

"Rationality, or reasoning is merely a higher development of intelligence and depends upon the power of mind to think in symbols, or to form abstract ideas, or concepts, which are relatively independent of particular objects. The older and more spontaneous form of this power of abstraction is what we call imagination. In reasoning we control our thoughts and have a very precise aim to see the actual meaning of the combined premises. It is performing experiments, as it were, in imagination. It would seem tolerably clear that reflective thought, as the latest phase of mind to develop fully, could not have much to do with the most primitive social origins. Such origins must be sought mainly in human instincts, in the 'trial and error' method of adaptation, and in resulting habits. . . . Nevertheless, man's higher intellectual powers have entered into social life increasingly as humanity has grown or found insufficient the trial and error method of adaptation."

"The first outcome of a distinctively human power of abstraction was articulate speech. By means of language, patterns of action in the mind could be symbolized and communicated. Thus a group tradition could be formed by means of which each generation could hand down to its successors its knowledge, ideas, standards, and values. The spoken word became the primary device which made cultural evolution possible." "Inventions and discoveries of all sorts are products of man's imagination and reasoning." "Only in the development and maintenance of the rational level of behavior lies the safety and security of civilization."

"The imitation theory of society unduly simplifies the social life. It is not true that the learning process is fundamentally an imitation process. Imitation is the chief means of propagating acquired uniformities of action in human groups. It is thus one of the basic

things in the development of those higher types of social or group life which depend upon acquired uniformity."

"Feeling is an accompaniment rather than an originator of activity. Nevertheless, because our valuing attitudes are largely feeling, it is feeling which chiefly sanctions behavior. From the earliest times, therefore, group life has sought to organize and control feeling. Typical emotions which have been appealed to in order to bring about desired group behavior in the past have been fear, anger, and sympathy."

"Sympathy as a form of feeling is not the root of altruistic impulses. These are given to us in our organic make-up. However, sympathy accompanies altruistic behavior and reinforces it. Especially are those higher forms of altruistic behavior which civilization finds it necessary to encourage impossible without rational sympathy."

"Probably the greatest means of cultivating sympathetic feeling in human society is through ethical religion. Sympathy and love are just as capable of being cultivated in human society as intelligence. If, however, they are cultivated apart from intelligence and if intelligence and sympathy are not made to cooperate, the total social result may not be one of progress. We shall have stable and well-balanced progress only when intelligence and good will are made to work together for the welfare of all men."

Much of the discussion of the book is carried along at a level of abstract generalization in which the ordinary psychologist will feel himself not quite at home. That the book is adapted, as its writer suggests, to be used by the student of society, "as a sort of laboratory manual" would seem possible only for an extremely metaphorical sense of that phrase. On the other hand, taken at its level, it is the careful work of an author who is widely informed, who is familiar with the writing of a great variety of psychologists, and who gives a constructive and well-balanced synthesis to materials from many sources.

The psychological reader will find much that is significant for his science on the functional side. For his social outlook he will find, in the reviewer's opinion, a judicious treatment of many large sociological questions, and in the closing chapter, a persuasive presentation of a fine social ideal.

DAVID C. ROGERS

SMITH COLLEGE

ROBERT H. THOULESS. *Social Psychology: A Text Book for Students of Economics*. London: University Tutorial Press Ltd. 1925. Pp. vii + 376.

"The present work is an attempt to cover the syllabus of the Psychology subsection of Sociology in the B.Sc. (Economics) examination of London University." As a matter of fact two chapters only (16 and 17) deal with "the psychology of economic value." The first chapter, on the scope and relations of social psychology, is up to date and clearly presented. Social psychology is an "ill-defined but important study lying between normal adult psychology on the one hand and sociology on the other" (p. 11). A place is made for the saner aspects of psychoanalysis. The viewpoint is professedly not particularly friendly to the behaviorist standpoint, but, as a matter of fact, the findings are not infrequently in agreement with the behaviorist conclusions. "The fruitful methods of modern psychology have been those in which knowledge of the mind obtained by introspection has been combined with all the knowledge that could be obtained by a study of human and animal behavior" (p. 6). The author takes a very sensible view of the relationship of physiology and psychology, one not usually acceptable to the authoritative British school: "We must remember that the distinctions between physiology and psychology, and between normal and abnormal psychology, are essentially distinctions of convenience in investigation, and that the interrelationships of these subjects are more profound than the differences between them" (p. 7).

This viewpoint bears fruit in the emphasis which the author places upon instinct. Almost half of his book (chs. 2-10) is devoted to an elaboration of a theory of instincts derived from McDougall, whom he follows in the main. On the whole he takes the purposive or teleological view of instinct instead of the purely physiological one, thus falling back in the last analysis upon a metaphysical rather than upon a natural science basis for his theories of social motivation. In this he agrees with the Scotch-English tradition. In his own words, "a human instinct is . . . always a general tendency; the particular forms of behavior in which it finds expression are the results of external circumstances which cannot be predicted merely from psychological considerations" (p. 155). In a section on McDougall's conception of instinct (pp. 73-4) he makes clear his metaphysical use of the word "tendency".

The justification for using McDougall's conception of instincts as an explanatory principle in the study of human behavior is neither

that his use of the word is the one right one nor that it is a "psychological" one. Its value as a hypothesis lies in the fact that it provides a serviceable account of a great part of human conduct.

In talking of instinct, we must continually remind ourselves that man inherits no detailed tendencies to lines of action. It is not true to say that man is instinctively afraid of large animals (as has been shown by Professor Watson). What is true is that he has an instinct of fear which is a tendency to feel the emotion of fear in danger situations and to adopt behavior leading to escape. By his own experience, or by influence received from other persons or books, this instinct may become specific to certain objects (such as lions and tigers), so that fear and escaping behavior will be called out by them. But it is only the general tendency to react in this way that is inherited, and such a tendency is what is meant by the word "instinct" as used by Professor McDougall.

In the reviewer's opinion the part of this book based primarily on the instinct-viewpoint is practically valueless for American readers. He gives no evidence whatever of any acquaintance with the voluminous American literature in criticism of the instinct-interpretation of human behavior. His metaphysical use of the term "tendency" enables him to employ all of McDougall's instincts and to adopt several new ones, including Professor Bartlett's instinct of primitive comradeship (pp. 157, 287). He tells us that it is generally recognized that man is innately suggestible, sympathetic and imitative (p. 156). Elsewhere¹ the present writer has endeavored to show the fallacy of attempting to escape from the contradictions inflicted by the facts of experience to the theory of dominant instincts, by appealing to the myth of general innate tendencies. These "tendencies" are, as a matter of fact, either definite physiological and neurological data, qualitatively not unlike "instincts," or they are nothing but metaphysical rationalizations or explanations after the fact.

The author holds the solution to his dilemma in his own book, for he points out a number of times (pp. 62, 141, 155, 180, 227, etc.) that innate mechanisms are organized and elaborated by the pressures of external circumstances and thereby our behavior is largely in response to what may be called environmental conditions. But he regards these finished behavior patterns as instinctive, apparently because he thinks of behavior from the standpoint of its adjustment value rather than of the mechanisms which determine it. Yet he

¹ *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology.*

emphasizes strongly the thesis that man is not a particularly rational or foreseeing creature (chs. 14, 15). In denying the fixity of instincts he falls into the trap of over-intellectualism, which he agrees with McDougall in condemning. He does not see that the only way of escaping from this dilemma is by throwing over the theory of instinct dominance and substituting for this doctrinaire interpretation the evidence of experience—an evidence establishing in the main the environmental determination of human behavior. He has presented data adequate for this transformation of viewpoint, but does not see its application.

In spite of this just criticism of one large aspect of this book, it must be said that there is even more to admire in it than to criticize. In the reviewer's opinion, he has been more successful—with the one exception here noted—in giving a psychological (not a sociological) interpretation to human behavior than any other writer on psychology, excepting Allport. The superiority of this book is not so much in a general viewpoint, throwing the whole treatment into a logical whole of superior merit, as in the many individual excellencies—too many to mention in detail. Almost everywhere there is abundant evidence of keen observation of actual facts of life and of careful and accurate interpretation of their meaning. He has come nearer than any other writer so far, perhaps, in finding the place of social psychology and in giving it a perspective. His psychology, with a few exceptions, is up to date, especially as far as the British literature is concerned. His treatment of will, emotion, feeling, thought, for example, is thoroughly naturalistic and has nothing of the old faculty viewpoint left in it. Best of all, he succeeds in connecting up the concepts of individual psychology with the social behavior processes, a thing which other writers on social psychology have scarcely yet attempted in detail.

Yet the organization is on the whole poor. The last few chapters on individual psychology, the psychology of aesthetics, and the psychology of scientific and religious development, look more or less as if they had been placed at the end because the author did not know just where else to put them. Nevertheless, they contain material essential to the treatment as a whole, and for the most part they are made to tie up with the main body of the work quite effectively. The chapter on individual psychology is concerned mainly with intelligence tests and might perhaps have found a place nearer the front of the book. In this chapter, as in the treatment of instinct, there are signs that the author has not read the latest American material.

The treatment of the psychology of economic value, which might (from the title of the book) be supposed to be the central theme of the work, seems to the reviewer to be inferior to the work of Cooley (who is not cited) in this field. The psychology of the market is considered almost wholly from the standpoint of the psychology of the appetites of the consumer. Thus, the suggestion made by Cooley that the market is a social affair and that valuations, economic and individual, are mainly determined by this fact, is in general neglected. The economist needs a sociological interpretation of the market even more than a psychological one, or at least a psychological interpretation from the angle of sociology rather than from that of physiology. In its larger control aspects, our world has become primarily sociological rather than merely physiological, and this means that it is dominated more by acquired than by native dispositions. It is because the author so largely neglects the social organization aspect—for which he may be excused in a book of the kind he has set out to write—that his suggestions are not more productive for economics. It may also explain his inference—which the reviewer believes to be erroneous, at least in so far as the word “incurable” is concerned—that there is an “incurable preference of most men for the religious [*i.e.*, mystical] adjustment” (p. 359).

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

L. L. BERNARD

FLORIAN ZNANIECKI. *The Laws of Social Psychology*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. viii+320. \$3.00.

Professor Florian Znaniecki, now professor of sociology in the University of Poznan, Poland, is a former pupil and co-laborer of Professor W. I. Thomas, with whom he collaborated on *The Polish Peasant*. We should expect him to carry out Thomas' ideas and methodological principles, and this he does very faithfully. In *Cultural Reality*, published in 1919, Znaniecki pointed out that the only theory of the human mind based upon empirical data which we have is that which makes it a product of culture. Professor Znaniecki therefore subscribes to historical relativism as a doctrine of knowledge. He insists that our whole world is permeated by culture, and that man sees even physical nature through the prism of culture, and usually acts upon it only in culturally determined ways. He therefore seemingly approaches closely to the cultural determinism of such writers as Kroeber and Lowie. But the book before us shows that even his cultural determinism is relative, and that he would impose

certain limits upon it. He finds that cultural determinism does not prevent us from reaching certain universally valid scientific laws.

This book undertakes to discover the laws of social interaction between persons. It is a work in social psychology in the narrowest sense of that phrase. Unlike Professor Knight Dunlap, he does not find that social psychology deals with human groupings and the mental factors involved therein, but with the specific "social" type of reactions, that is, the reactions that arise from the experiences of human beings of one another, or what is ordinarily called social interaction. Such social action is a relatively closed system and shows certain uniformities or laws. These laws, to be sure, are not of a quantitative character, and Professor Znaniecki strongly argues that the seeking after quantitative laws in social relations is vain, or, at best, introductory. The requirement of scientific exactness will be met in the social sciences when we can demonstrate qualitative laws, or universal causal relations, existing between social phenomena.

The book is devoted to the careful discussion and demonstration of about a dozen such qualitative laws in the interaction of persons. Such, for example, is the law that "If the object of a social action becomes inaccessible to this action, the tendency of this action becomes less sensualistic and more idealistic" (p. 173). Professor Znaniecki cites numerous cases from social experience to support these alleged social laws. It is possible, of course, that his evidence has not been carefully sifted in all cases, but he certainly shows the inductive spirit in making his generalizations.

One may well raise the question whether in this last book Professor Znaniecki has not himself overthrown the "culturalism" of which he has hitherto been an exponent. In showing that there are certain laws of social interaction between individuals that are universal, he certainly shows that a part of the social process is independent of culture. His position would therefore seem to be that there are certain laws of human behavior within which the cultural process goes on, and that the cultural process accordingly is not the whole of the social process.

Professor Znaniecki's book is valuable also for the body blow which it gives to radical behaviorism. In the final chapter of his book he makes a criticism of behaviorism which, from the standpoint of the social sciences at least, may be considered final. He says (p. 306): "The ordinary outside observer and the behaviorist miss that whole stage of the action which conditions and precedes what seems to them the purely objective process of stimulation, because

they do not take the agent primarily as a *subject*, to whom changes of the milieu are given, but as an *object*, in whose apparent reactions to the changes of other objects they are interested. . . . If the psychologist wishes to study the action in its original course and its actual significance, he cannot define it as the behaviorists do, but must follow the agent's own experience of it. Furthermore, he must remember that the world in which the action happens is not "nature," that rigid and schematized, rationalistic extract of the original world of human experience. It is the *cultural* world, full of meaning, containing innumerable objects which have no material existence at all, or merely a symbolic nucleus of materiality, and yet are as real to the human agent as any mountain or tree; containing qualities which perhaps appear only to a small group of human subjects, and yet to them may be as important for practical purposes as the weight or velocity of bodies."

Behaviorists, therefore, will do well to take note of this book. They may be able from it to understand some of the criticisms which students of human society level at their psychology.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

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